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Ideology signaling in electoral politics

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  • Hisashi Sawaki

Abstract

This paper considers an electoral model in which an incumbent and a challenger have ideological policy preferences that are private information. The incumbent may bias pre-electoral policies to signal preferences to the electorate with the aim of affecting the outcome of the election. When the two candidates are of completely different types, such a policy bias can occur only in a moderate direction. However, when their possible types overlap, a policy bias can be created in either a moderate or an extreme direction.

Suggested Citation

  • Hisashi Sawaki, 2017. "Ideology signaling in electoral politics," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 29(1), pages 48-68, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:29:y:2017:i:1:p:48-68
    DOI: 10.1177/0951629816630429
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    References listed on IDEAS

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