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Flip-Flopping: Ideological Adjustment Costs in the United States Senate

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  • Jason M. DeBacker

Abstract

Using a long panel of roll call voting data, I find that “flip-flopping" senators face significant electoral costs when changing positions. In models of electoral competition, as the costs to candidates changing position approach zero, the equilibrium prediction is the convergence of platforms. Such convergence is at odds with empirical observation. Using a dynamic, structural model of candidate positioning, I identify the nature of the costs associated with changing position that may result in such non-convergence.

Suggested Citation

  • Jason M. DeBacker, 2014. "Flip-Flopping: Ideological Adjustment Costs in the United States Senate," Working Papers 201403, Middle Tennessee State University, Department of Economics and Finance.
  • Handle: RePEc:mts:wpaper:201403
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    File URL: http://capone.mtsu.edu/berc/working/Ideo_Adj.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Gersbach, Hans & Tejada, Oriol, 2018. "A Reform Dilemma in polarized democracies," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 148-158.
    2. Forand, Jean Guillaume, 2014. "Two-party competition with persistent policies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 64-91.
    3. Giorgio Bellettini & Paolo Roberti, 2020. "Politicians’ coherence and government debt," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 182(1), pages 73-91, January.
    4. Gaetan Fournier & Alberto Grillo & Yevgeny Tsodikovich, 2023. "Strategic flip-flopping in political competition," Papers 2305.02834, arXiv.org.
    5. Nunnari, Salvatore & Zápal, Jan, 2017. "Dynamic Elections and Ideological Polarization," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 25(4), pages 505-534, October.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Ideology; Voting; Politics;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis

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