What Does the Public Know about Economic Policy, and How Does It Know It?
A long tradition in economic theory models economic policy decisions as solutions to optimization problems solved by rational and well-informed agents: A single policymaker minimizes a loss function subject to some constraints. Another body of literature models policy decisions as if they were made by well-informed voters in elections of some sort.
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Volume (Year): 35 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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