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Knowledge, Political Innovation and Referendum

In: The Regional Economics of Knowledge and Talent

Author

Listed:
  • Tsuyoshi Hatori
  • Kiyoshi Kobayashi

Abstract

The distinguished contributors advance the current research frontier in three novel directions which focus on: the role of human capital and talent for creativity, entrepreneurship and regional development; the role of institutions for the behaviour of firms and entrepreneurs; and the influence of the global context on the location, export and innovation behaviour of firms in a knowledge economy.

Suggested Citation

  • Tsuyoshi Hatori & Kiyoshi Kobayashi, 2012. "Knowledge, Political Innovation and Referendum," Chapters, in: Charlie Karlsson & Börje Johansson & Roger R. Stough (ed.), The Regional Economics of Knowledge and Talent, chapter 9, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:13425_9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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