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The Determinants of US Congressional Voting on the Trade and Development Act of 2000

Author

Listed:
  • Baban Hasnat

    (Department of Business Administration and Economics, State University of New York College at Brockport, U.S.A.)

  • Charles Callahan, III

    (Department of Business Administration and Economics, State University of New York College at Brockport, U.S.A.)

Abstract

The paper provides an empirical examination of the determinants of support for the Trade and Development Act of 2000 (TDA2000) in the United States Congress. We estimate a logistic regression model and control for both economic and political influences. We find that business political action committee contributions to lawmakers, the percentage of the African-American population in their constituency, the percentage of the Hispanic population in their constituency, and the skill level of the constituents had a significant positive influence on lawmakers voting in favor of TDA2000. Democratic party affiliation, import-competing industries in the constituency, and labor union membership had a significant negative influence on the TDA2000 vote.

Suggested Citation

  • Baban Hasnat & Charles Callahan, III, 2004. "The Determinants of US Congressional Voting on the Trade and Development Act of 2000," International Journal of Business and Economics, School of Management Development, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan, vol. 3(1), pages 35-44, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:ijb:journl:v:3:y:2004:i:1:p:35-44
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations

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