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The politics of beer: analysis of the congressional votes on the beer bill of 1933

Author

Listed:
  • Eline Poelmans

    () (KU Leuven)

  • John A. Dove

    () (Troy University)

  • Jason E. Taylor

    () (Central Michigan University)

Abstract

Nine days after he took office in March 1933, Franklin Roosevelt asked Congress to amend existing federal Prohibition policy so as to allow for the sale and consumption of 3.2% alcohol beer. Over the following 8 days, the so-called “beer bill” was proposed, debated, passed and signed into law. This study analyzes the political decision making behind one of FDR’s earliest New Deal policies. Specifically, we consider how voter preferences, representatives’ ideologies, national party affiliations, and the influence of special interests affected legislative decision making. We find that special interests and party affiliations were particularly important drivers of congressional voting behavior.

Suggested Citation

  • Eline Poelmans & John A. Dove & Jason E. Taylor, 2018. "The politics of beer: analysis of the congressional votes on the beer bill of 1933," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 174(1), pages 81-106, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:174:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-017-0493-1
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-017-0493-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Kym Anderson & Giulia Meloni & Johan Swinnen, 2018. "Global Alcohol Markets: Evolving Consumption Patterns, Regulations, and Industrial Organizations," Annual Review of Resource Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 10(1), pages 105-132, October.
    2. Peter T. Leeson & M. Scott King & Tate J. Fegley, 2020. "Regulating quack medicine," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 182(3), pages 273-286, March.
    3. Timini, Jacopo, 2020. "Staying dry on Spanish wine: The rejection of the 1905 Spanish-Italian trade agreement," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).

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