Inter-party Competition, Intra-party Competition, and Distributive Policy: A Model and Test Using New Deal Data
This paper presents a theoretical model examining the influence of two stylized types of voters: "loyal voters" and "swing voters". The model shows why both types of voters will influence the distribution of benefits by a reelection-seeking incumbent, and it predicts how their influence will vary with the importance of the general election relative to that of the primary: closer competition between parties in the general election, ceteris paribus, increases the influence of swing voters relative to that of loyal voters. County-level data on the allocation of money and jobs by New Deal relief programs confirm the model's predictions. Copyright 2001 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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