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Foreign Aid and Domestic Politics: Voting in Congress and the Allocation of USAID Contracts across Congressional Districts

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  • Robert K. Fleck
  • Christopher Kilby

Abstract

This paper investigates the relationship between congressional support for foreign aid and the distribution of United States Agency for International Development (USAID) contract spending across congressional districts within the United States. The extent to which such a relationship matters has become increasingly important in recent years, as the end of the Cold War and the advent of the Republican‐controlled Congress have eroded the traditional base of support for foreign aid. We develop a model to illustrate how the distribution of contract spending could be used to increase support for foreign aid, but at the expense of development impact, in effect trading quality for quantity. Data on domestic foreign aid contract spending and votes in the 104th Congress House of Representatives allow us to test whether the geographic distribution of USAID contract spending within the United States is consistent with a systematic attempt to build support for foreign aid in Congress. Econometric results provide little evidence of such attempts, apparently because voting on this issue is insensitive to the distribution of contract spending.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert K. Fleck & Christopher Kilby, 2001. "Foreign Aid and Domestic Politics: Voting in Congress and the Allocation of USAID Contracts across Congressional Districts," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 67(3), pages 598-617, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:soecon:v:67:y:2001:i:3:p:598-617
    DOI: 10.1002/j.2325-8012.2001.tb00358.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Mohamed Naser, 2017. "Kuwait's Foreign Policy towards Regional Issues in the Middle East from 2003 to 2014," Asian Social Science, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 13(11), pages 1-95, November.
    2. Robert K. Fleck & Christopher Kilby, 2006. "World Bank Independence: A Model and Statistical Analysis of US Influence," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(2), pages 224-240, May.
    3. McLean, Elena V., 2023. "Looking for advice: The politics of consulting services procurement in the World Bank," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 161(C).
    4. Gabriella R. Montinola, 2022. "Simone Dietrich. 2021. States, Markets and Foreign Aid. (New York: Cambridge University Press)," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 663-666, July.
    5. Robert K. Fleck & Christopher Kilby, 2006. "How Do Political Changes Influence US Bilateral Aid Allocations? Evidence from Panel Data," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(2), pages 210-223, May.

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