Veto players and foreign aid provision
This study investigates how the political institutions of developed economies influence their foreign assistance. Specifically, we argue that the number of effective veto players has a negative effect on the volume of aid provision. To provide foreign assistance, the incumbent government in a donor country must have unanimous support from all effective veto players in policy making. Thus, it has more barriers to overcome when the polity is characterized by many and preference-wise heterogeneous veto players. By examining the official development assistance outflows of 27 OECD countries for the period of 1977–2006, we find empirical patterns that corroborate our argument. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- J. A. Hausman, 1976.
"Specification Tests in Econometrics,"
185, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- W. J. Henisz, 2000. "The Institutional Environment for Economic Growth," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(1), pages 1-31, 03.
- Derek Headey, 2008. "Geopolitics and the effect of foreign aid on economic growth: 1970-2001," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 20(2), pages 161-180.
- William Easterly & Ross Levine & David Roodman, 2004. "Aid, Policies, and Growth: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(3), pages 774-780, June.
- Witold J. Henisz, 2002. "The institutional environment for infrastructure investment," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(2), pages 355-389.
- Dalgaard, Carl-Johan & Hansen, Henrik & Tarp, Finn, 2002.
"On the Empirics of Foreign Aid and Growth,"
63696, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Collier, Paul & Dollar, David, 1999.
"Aid allocation and poverty reduction,"
Policy Research Working Paper Series
2041, The World Bank.
- Alberto Alesina & David Dollar, 1998.
"Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?,"
NBER Working Papers
6612, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- William Easterly, 2003. "Can Foreign Aid Buy Growth?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(3), pages 23-48, Summer.
- Simeon Djankov & Jose Montalvo & Marta Reynal-Querol, 2008.
"The curse of aid,"
Journal of Economic Growth,
Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 169-194, September.
- Simeon Djankov & José Garcia Montalvo & Marta Reynal-Querol, 2005. "The curse of aid," Economics Working Papers 870, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Simeon Djankov & José G. Montalvo & Marta Reynal-Querol, 2005. "The curse of aid," Working Papers 257, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- P. Lundborg, 1998. "Foreign Aid and International Support as a Gift Exchange," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(2), pages 127-142, 07.
- Maizels, Alfred & Nissanke, Machiko K., 1984. "Motivations for aid to developing countries," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 12(9), pages 879-900, September.
- Oecd, 2002. "Aid volume, channels and allocations for poverty reduction," OECD Journal on Development, OECD Publishing, vol. 3(3), pages 33-46.
- Chong, Alberto & Gradstein, Mark, 2008. "What determines foreign aid? The donors' perspective," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 1-13, August.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:24:y:2013:i:1:p:43-56. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.