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Foreign Aid and International Support as a Gift Exchange


  • P. Lundborg


Regressions on data from 1948 to 1979 indicate that the US and the Soviet Union used foreign aid to stimulate international political support from the receivers of aid and that aid receivers allocated their political support to stimulate aid from these donors. The regressions are based on a game theoretical model in which aid donors provide aid to reach foreign policy goals and in which aid receivers in return give political support to the donors so as to raise foreign aid. With foreign policy ambitions, aid should be given the countries with low GDP levels, while if altruistic considerations determine aid, countries with low levels of GDP per capita should be the beneficiaries. Since foreign aid to some extent was the result of cold war rivalry, the changes in international relations which occurred with the fall of the Soviet Union, should lower total foreign aid. Copyright 1998 Blackwell Publishers Ltd..

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  • P. Lundborg, 1998. "Foreign Aid and International Support as a Gift Exchange," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(2), pages 127-142, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:10:y:1998:i:2:p:127-142

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Pincin, Jared, 2012. "Foreign aid and political influence of the development assistance committee countries," MPRA Paper 39668, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Yu Wang & Shuai Jin, 2013. "Veto players and foreign aid provision," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 43-56, March.
    3. Knack, Stephen & Rahman, Aminur, 2007. "Donor fragmentation and bureaucratic quality in aid recipients," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(1), pages 176-197, May.
    4. Dreher, Axel & Jensen, Nathan M., 2013. "Country or leader? Political change and UN General Assembly voting," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 183-196.
    5. Isopi, Alessia & Mavrotas, George, 2006. "Aid Allocation and Aid Effectiveness: An Empirical Analysis," WIDER Working Paper Series 007, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    6. Balla, Eliana & Reinhardt, Gina Yannitell, 2008. "Giving and Receiving Foreign Aid: Does Conflict Count?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 36(12), pages 2566-2585, December.
    7. Axel Dreher & Jan-Egbert Sturm, 2006. "Do IMF and World Bank Influence Voting in the UN General Assembly?," CESifo Working Paper Series 1724, CESifo Group Munich.
    8. Platteau, Jean-Philippe & Sekeris, Petros G., 2010. "On the feasibility of power and status ranking in traditional setups," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 267-282, September.
    9. Azam, Jean-Paul & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 2003. "Contracting for aid," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 25-58, February.
    10. Axel Dreher & Peter Nunnenkamp & Rainer Thiele, 2008. "Does US aid buy UN general assembly votes? A disaggregated analysis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 136(1), pages 139-164, July.
    11. Diana Panke, 2017. "Speech is silver, silence is golden? Examining state activity in international negotiations," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 121-146, March.
    12. Knack, Stephen, 2000. "Aid dependence and the quality of governance : a cross-country empirical analysis," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2396, The World Bank.
    13. Anke Hoeffler & Scott Gates, 2004. "Global Aid Allocation: Are Nordic Donors Different?," Economics Series Working Papers WPS/2004-34, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    14. Graham Bird & Ramkishen S. Rajan, 2001. "Coping with, and cashing in on, international capital volatility," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 13(1), pages 1-23.
    15. Scott Gates & Anke Hoeffler, 2004. "Global Aid Allocation: Are Nordic Donors Different?," CSAE Working Paper Series 2004-34, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
    16. Huysentruyt, Marieke & Barrett, Christopher B. & McPeak, John G., 2002. "Social Identity And Manipulative Interhousehold Transfers Among East African Pastoralists," Working Papers 14746, Cornell University, Department of Applied Economics and Management.
    17. Bernhard Boockmann & Axel Dreher, 2011. "Do human rights offenders oppose human rights resolutions in the United Nations?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 146(3), pages 443-467, March.
    18. Axel Dreher & Jan-Egbert Sturm & James Raymond Vreeland, 2006. "Does Membership on the UN Security Council Influence IMF Decisions? Evidence from Panel Data," CESifo Working Paper Series 1808, CESifo Group Munich.
    19. Mavrotas, George & Villanger, Espen, 2006. "Multilateral Aid Agencies and Strategic Donor Behaviour," WIDER Working Paper Series DP2006/02, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    20. Lazarev, Valery & Gregory, Paul, 2003. "Commissars and cars: A case study in the political economy of dictatorship," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 1-19, March.
    21. Axel Dreher & Jan-Egbert Sturm, 2012. "Do the IMF and the World Bank influence voting in the UN General Assembly?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(1), pages 363-397, April.

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