Explaining House Voting on the North American Free Trade Agreement
This paper analyzes representatives' voting patterns on NAFTA. The public choice model posits that representatives vote to redistribute wealth to constituents. Evidence presented here indicates that the Heckscher-Ohlin model is appropriate to represent the redistributional effects of NAFTA. Using a three-factor variant of the Heckscher-Ohlin model, evidence is presented indicating that representatives voted to redistribute wealth to their geographical and electoral constituents. The ability of geographically concentrated interests and of special interests to influence representatives' votes helps to explain the weak party allegiance demonstrated on the NAFTA vote. Copyright 1997 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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