IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Do Human Rights Offenders Oppose Human Rights Resolutions in the United Nations?

We investigate voting behavior on human rights in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Our central question is whether countries with a low human rights record systematically oppose human rights resolutions. An instrumental account of voting would suggest that these countries aim to weaken UN human rights resolutions since they could be future targets of these policies. If reputation aspects and other non-instrumental motives dominate, the influence can go in either direction. We estimate determinants of voting on the basis of 13,000 individual voting decisions from 1980 to 2002. Our results from ordered probit estimation show that a country’s human rights situation is irrelevant to voting behavior if regional dependence of voting is controlled for. This suggests that countries’ voting decisions are not made independently from each other. The results also show that simple rules for aggregating voting choices can lead to misleading results.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.kof.ethz.ch/publications/science/pdf/wp_163.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich in its series KOF Working papers with number 07-163.

as
in new window

Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:kof:wpskof:07-163
Contact details of provider: Postal: Leonhardstrasse 21, CH-8092 Zürich
Phone: +41 44 632 42 39
Fax: +41 44 632 12 18
Web page: http://www.kof.ethz.ch
Email:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Gilbert,Christopher L. & Vines,David (ed.), 2006. "The World Bank," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521029018.
  2. Anke Hoeffler & Scott Gates, 2004. "Global Aid Allocation: Are Nordic Donors Different?," Economics Series Working Papers WPS/2004-34, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  3. Dreher, Axel & Gassebner, Martin & Siemers, Lars-H. R., 2010. "Globalization, economic freedom and human rights," Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research Discussion Papers 115, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
  4. Boockmann, Bernhard, 2002. "Mixed motives: an empirical analysis of ILO roll-call votes," ZEW Discussion Papers 02-40, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  5. Axel Dreher & Martin Gassebner & Lars-H. R. Siemers, 2012. "Globalization, Economic Freedom, and Human Rights," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 56(3), pages 516-546, June.
  6. Axel Dreher & Peter Nunnenkamp & Rainer Thiele, 2006. "Does US Aid Buy UN General Assembly Votes? A Disaggregated Analysis," KOF Working papers 06-138, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich.
  7. Richard Blundell & Steve Bond, 1995. "Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models," IFS Working Papers W95/17, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
  8. Abdul Ghafar Noury & Simon Hix & Gérard Roland, 2007. "Democratic politics in the European Parliament," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/7744, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  9. Broz, J. Lawrence & Hawes, Michael Brewster, 2006. "Congressional Politics of Financing the International Monetary Fund," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 60(02), pages 367-399, April.
  10. Eric Neumayer, 2006. "Do international human rights treaties improve respect for human rights?," Conferences on New Political Economy, in: Max Albert & Stefan Voigt & Dieter Schmidtchen (ed.), Conferences on New Political Economy, edition 1, volume 23, pages 69-104(36 Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen.
  11. Stratmann, Thomas, 1998. "The Market for Congressional Votes: Is Timing of Contributions Everything?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(1), pages 85-113, April.
  12. Steven D. Levitt & James M. Snyder, Jr., 1995. "The Impact of Federal Spending on House Election Outcomes," NBER Working Papers 5002, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Voeten, Erik, 2000. "Clashes in the Assembly," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 54(02), pages 185-215, March.
  14. Windmeijer, Frank, 2005. "A finite sample correction for the variance of linear efficient two-step GMM estimators," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 126(1), pages 25-51, May.
  15. Barro, Robert J. & Lee, Jong-Wha, 2005. "IMF programs: Who is chosen and what are the effects?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(7), pages 1245-1269, October.
  16. Robert K. Fleck & Christopher Kilby, 2001. "Foreign Aid and Domestic Politics: Voting in Congress and the Allocation of USAID Contracts across Congressional Districts," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 67(3), pages 598-617, January.
  17. David Roodman, 2009. "How to do xtabond2: An introduction to difference and system GMM in Stata," Stata Journal, StataCorp LP, vol. 9(1), pages 86-136, March.
  18. Alberto Alesina & David Dollar, 1998. "Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?," NBER Working Papers 6612, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  19. Alesina, Alberto & Weder, Beatrice, 2002. "Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign Aid?," Scholarly Articles 4553011, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  20. P. Lundborg, 1998. "Foreign Aid and International Support as a Gift Exchange," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(2), pages 127-142, 07.
  21. Niklas Potrafke, 2009. "Does government ideology influence political alignment with the U.S.? An empirical analysis of voting in the UN General Assembly," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 245-268, September.
  22. Fleck, Robert K & Kilby, Christopher, 2002. " Reassessing the Role of Constituency in Congressional Voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 112(1-2), pages 31-53, July.
  23. Kilby, Christopher, 2009. "The political economy of conditionality: An empirical analysis of World Bank loan disbursements," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 51-61, May.
  24. Andersen, Thomas Barnebeck & Harr, Thomas & Tarp, Finn, 2006. "On US politics and IMF lending," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(7), pages 1843-1862, October.
  25. Kim, Soo Yeon & Russett, Bruce, 1996. "The new politics of voting alignments in the United Nations General Assembly," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 50(04), pages 629-652, September.
  26. Levitt, Steven D, 1996. "How Do Senators Vote? Disentangling the Role of Voter Preferences, Party Affiliation, and Senate Ideology," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 425-41, June.
  27. Christopher Kilby, 2009. "Donor influence in international financial institutions: Deciphering what alignment measures measure," Villanova School of Business Department of Economics and Statistics Working Paper Series 8, Villanova School of Business Department of Economics and Statistics.
  28. M Arellano & O Bover, 1990. "Another Look at the Instrumental Variable Estimation of Error-Components Models," CEP Discussion Papers dp0007, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
  29. Geoffrey Brennan & Alan Hamlin, 1998. "Expressive voting and electoral equilibrium," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 95(1), pages 149-175, April.
  30. Rai, Kul B., 1972. "Foreign Policy and Voting in the UN General Assembly," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 26(03), pages 589-594, June.
  31. Axel Dreher & Jan-Egbert Sturm, 2006. "Do IMF and World Bank Influence Voting in the UN General Assembly?," CESifo Working Paper Series 1724, CESifo Group Munich.
  32. Bernhard Boockmann, 2003. "Mixed Motives: An Empirical Analysis of ILO Roll-Call Voting," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 263-285, December.
  33. Axel Dreher & Martin Gassebner & Lars-H. R. Siemers, 2007. "Does Terror Threaten Human Rights? Evidence from Panel Data," KOF Working papers 07-156, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich.
  34. Vreeland, James Raymond, 2008. "Political Institutions and Human Rights: Why Dictatorships Enter into the United Nations Convention Against Torture," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 62(01), pages 65-101, January.
  35. J. Broz, 2008. "Congressional voting on funding the international financial institutions," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 3(4), pages 351-374, December.
  36. Scott Gates & Anke Hoeffler, 2004. "Global Aid Allocation: Are Nordic Donors Different?," CSAE Working Paper Series 2004-34, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
  37. Dahlberg, Matz & Johansson, Eva, 1999. "On the Vote Purchasing Behavior of Incumbent Governments," Working Paper Series 1999:24, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
  38. Axel Dreher & Nathan Jensen, 2003. "Independent Actor or Agent? An Empirical Analysis of the impact of US interests on IMF Conditions," International Finance 0310004, EconWPA, revised 08 Jan 2004.
  39. Christopher Kilby, 2006. "Donor influence in multilateral development banks: The case of the Asian Development Bank," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 173-195, June.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kof:wpskof:07-163. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.