Does membership on the UN security council influence IMF conditionality?
We investigate whether elected members of the United Nations Security Council receive favorable treatment from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), analyzing panel data on the level of conditionality attached to (a maximum of) 314 IMF arrangements with 101 countries over the period of 1992 to 2008. We find a negative relationship: Security Council members receive about 30 percent fewer conditions attached to the loans that they receive from the IMF. We conclude that conditionality is softer for these countries because the major shareholders of the IMF desire influence over the Security Council.
|Date of creation:||2010|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.cege.wiso.uni-goettingen.de/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Jan-Egbert Sturm & Helge Berger & Jakob de Haan, 2005.
"Which Variables Explain Decisions On Imf Credit? An Extreme Bounds Analysis,"
Economics and Politics,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17, pages 177-213, 07.
- Helge Berger & Jakob de Haan & Jan-Egbert Sturm, 2005. "Which Variables Explain Decisions on IMF Credit? An Extreme Bounds Analysis ," TWI Research Paper Series 13, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz.
- Sturm, Jan-Egbert & Berger, Helge & de Haan, Jakob, 2004. "Which variables explain decisions on IMF credit? An extreme bounds analysis," Discussion Papers 2004/15, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
- Dreher, Axel, 2005.
"IMF and Economic Growth: The Effects of Programs, Loans, and Compliance with Conditionality,"
Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Kiel 2005
11, Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics.
- Dreher, Axel, 2006. "IMF and economic growth: The effects of programs, loans, and compliance with conditionality," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 34(5), pages 769-788, May.
- Axel Dreher, 2004. "IMF and Economic Growth: The Effects of Programs, Loans, and Compliance with Conditionality," TWI Research Paper Series 1, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz.
- Axel Dreher, 2004. "IMF and Economic Growth: The Effects of Programs, Loans, and Compliance with Conditionality," International Finance 0404004, EconWPA, revised 25 Apr 2004.
- Graham Bird, 2001. "IMF Programmes: Is there a conditionality Laffer Curve?," World Economics, World Economics, Economic & Financial Publishing, 1 Ivory Square, Plantation Wharf, London, United Kingdom, SW11 3UE, vol. 2(2), pages 29-49, April.
- Beck, Thorsten & Clarke, George & Groff, Alberto & Keefer, Philip & Walsh, Patrick, 2000. "New tools and new tests in comparative political economy - the database of political institutions," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2283, The World Bank.
- repec:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-3125517 is not listed on IDEAS
- Barro, Robert J. & Lee, Jong-Wha, 2005.
"IMF programs: Who is chosen and what are the effects?,"
Journal of Monetary Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 52(7), pages 1245-1269, October.
- Robert J Barro & Jong-Wha Lee, 2003. "IMF Programs: Who Is Chosen and What Are the Effects?," Departmental Working Papers 2003-09, The Australian National University, Arndt-Corden Department of Economics.
- Robert J. Barro & Jong-Wha Lee, 2002. "IMF Programs: Who is Chosen and What Are the Effects?," NBER Working Papers 8951, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Axel Dreher, 2009.
"IMF conditionality: theory and evidence,"
Springer, vol. 141(1), pages 233-267, October.
- James Vreeland, 2006. "IMF program compliance: Aggregate index versus policy specific research strategies," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 1(4), pages 359-378, December.
- Axel Dreher & Roland Vaubel, 2003.
"The Causes and Consequences of IMF Conditionality,"
0309004, EconWPA, revised 17 Oct 2003.
- Axel Dreher & Nathan Jensen, 2003.
"Independent Actor or Agent? An Empirical Analysis of the impact of US interests on IMF Conditions,"
0310004, EconWPA, revised 08 Jan 2004.
- Axel Dreher & Nathan Jensen, 2005. "Independent Actor or Agent? An Empirical Analysis of the impact of US interests on IMF Conditions," KOF Working papers 05-118, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich.
- repec:cup:cbooks:9780521816755 is not listed on IDEAS
- Axel Dreher, 2004. "A Public Choice Perspective of IMF and World Bank Lending and Conditionality," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 119(3_4), pages 445-464, 06.
- Dreher, Axel & Sturm, Jan-Egbert & Vreeland, James Raymond, 2009. "Global horse trading: IMF loans for votes in the United Nations Security Council," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(7), pages 742-757, October.
- World Bank, 2008. "World Development Indicators 2008," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 11855, March.
- Alex Mourmouras & Anna Ivanova & George C. Anayotos & Wolfgang Mayer, 2003. "What Determines the Implementation of IMF-Supported Programs?," IMF Working Papers 03/8, International Monetary Fund.
- Christopher Kilby, 2006. "Donor influence in multilateral development banks: The case of the Asian Development Bank," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 173-195, June.
- Gould, Erica R., 2003. "Money Talks: Supplementary Financiers and International Monetary Fund Conditionality," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 57(03), pages 551-586, June.
- Ruben Atoyan & Patrick Conway, 2006. "Evaluating the impact of IMF programs: A comparison of matching and instrumental-variable estimators," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 99-124, June.
- Przeworski, Adam & Vreeland, James Raymond, 2000. "The effect of IMF programs on economic growth," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 385-421, August.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:cegedp:104. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.