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IMF Programmes: Is there a conditionality Laffer Curve?

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Abstract

The long-standing debate over IMF conditionality has received a new lease of life in the context of the debate over a new international financial architecture. Conditionality has increased in recent years and some proposals for reform envisage a continuation of this trend. However, by emphasising the importance of implementation as well as design it may be argued that increased conditionality will have a negative effect on final out-turns; there may be a conditionality Laffer curve. The policy issue is whether conditionality has reached or gone beyond its optimal level. There is some evidence that is consistent with the claim that conditionality has become excessive.

Suggested Citation

  • Graham Bird, 2001. "IMF Programmes: Is there a conditionality Laffer Curve?," World Economics, World Economics, 1 Ivory Square, Plantation Wharf, London, United Kingdom, SW11 3UE, vol. 2(2), pages 29-49, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:wej:wldecn:55
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    Cited by:

    1. Armenia ANDRONICEANU & Gurgen OHANYAN, 2015. "Cooperation between European Governments and the IMF: Conditionality Impact on Employment within the EU," REVISTA DE MANAGEMENT COMPARAT INTERNATIONAL/REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE MANAGEMENT, Faculty of Management, Academy of Economic Studies, Bucharest, Romania, vol. 16(3), pages 324-334, July.
    2. Christoph A. Schaltegger & Martin Weder, 2015. "Fiscal Adjustments and the Probability of Sovereign Default," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(1), pages 81-110, February.
    3. Peter Leeson & Christopher Coyne, 2007. "The reformers’ dilemma: media, policy ownership, and reform," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 23(3), pages 237-250, June.
    4. Bird, Graham, 2001. "IMF Programs: Do They Work? Can They be Made to Work Better?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 29(11), pages 1849-1865, November.
    5. ., 2016. "Introduction and overview: the purposes and operations of the IMF," Chapters,in: The International Monetary Fund, chapter 1, pages 1-18 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    6. Axel Dreher & Jan-Egbert Sturm & James Raymond Vreeland, 2015. "Politics and IMF Conditionality," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 59(1), pages 120-148, February.
    7. Fink, Fabian & Scholl, Almuth, 2016. "A quantitative model of sovereign debt, bailouts and conditionality," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 176-190.
    8. Dreher, Axel & Sturm, Jan-Egbert & Vreeland, James Raymond, 2010. "Does membership on the UN security council influence IMF conditionality?," Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research Discussion Papers 104, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
    9. Graham Bird, 2004. "Growth, poverty and the IMF," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 16(4), pages 621-636.
    10. Graham Bird, 2008. "The implementation of IMF programs: A conceptual framework," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 41-64, March.
    11. Ruxanda Berlinschi, 2010. "Reputation concerns in aid conditionality," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 5(4), pages 433-459, December.
    12. repec:got:cegedp:104 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Gurgen OHANYAN, 2015. "Recent Changes of IMF Conditionality and Its Effects on Social Spending," REVISTA DE MANAGEMENT COMPARAT INTERNATIONAL/REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE MANAGEMENT, Faculty of Management, Academy of Economic Studies, Bucharest, Romania, vol. 16(5), pages 591-602, December.

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