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Fiscal Adjustments and the Probability of Sovereign Default

  • Schaltegger, Christoph
  • Weder, Martin

Based on probit estimates, this paper analyzes the effects of fiscal consolidation on the proba-bility of sovereign defaults in the short run. Using a panel of 104 developing countries from 1980 to 2009 and controlling for various economic, fiscal and political factors, we find that fiscal adjustments in general do not significantly reduce the probably of default even if they are large. Instead, the composition of budget consolidation is decisive in reducing default risk. In contrast to industrialized countries, expenditure based adjustments are not successful while revenue based adjustments lower the probability of default in the following year by 33 to 56 percent. This finding also holds when economic growth is low or government debt is high as well as when IMF lending is taken into account.

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File URL: http://econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/79979/1/VfS_2013_pid_364.pdf
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Paper provided by Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association in its series Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order with number 79979.

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Date of creation: 2013
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:vfsc13:79979
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.socialpolitik.org/
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