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Who Controls the Bureaucracy?: Presidential Power, Congressional Dominance, Legal Constraints, and Bureaucratic Autonomy in a Model of Multi-institutional Policy-Making

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  • Hammond, Thomas H
  • Knott, Jack H

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Suggested Citation

  • Hammond, Thomas H & Knott, Jack H, 1996. "Who Controls the Bureaucracy?: Presidential Power, Congressional Dominance, Legal Constraints, and Bureaucratic Autonomy in a Model of Multi-institutional Policy-Making," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 12(1), pages 119-166, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:12:y:1996:i:1:p:119-66
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Scott Carrell & Janice Hauge, 2009. "Politics and the implementation of public policy: The case of the US military housing allowance program," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 138(3), pages 367-386, March.
    2. John M. de Figueiredo & Edward H. Stiglitz, 2015. "Democratic Rulemaking," NBER Working Papers 21765, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Axel Dreher & Nathan Jensen, 2003. "Independent Actor or Agent? An Empirical Analysis of the impact of US interests on IMF Conditions," International Finance 0310004, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 08 Jan 2004.
    4. Moshe Maor, 2016. "Missing Areas in the Bureaucratic Reputation Framework," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 4(2), pages 80-90.
    5. Marco Sorge, 2015. "Lobbying (strategically appointed) bureaucrats," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 171-189, June.
    6. Jordan Carr Peterson, 2018. "All Their Eggs in One Basket? Ideological Congruence in Congress and the Bicameral Origins of Concentrated Delegation to the Bureaucracy," Laws, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 7(2), pages 1-15, May.
    7. Peter Zweifel & Friedrich Breyer, 2012. "The Economics of Social Health Insurance," Chapters, in: Andrew M. Jones (ed.), The Elgar Companion to Health Economics, Second Edition, chapter 12, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    8. Matthew C. Stephenson, 2013. "Does Separation of Powers Promote Stability and Moderation?," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(2), pages 331-368.
    9. Thomas H. Hammond, 2015. "A unified spatial model of American political institutions," Chapters, in: Jac C. Heckelman & Nicholas R. Miller (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Voting, chapter 11, pages 182-200, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    10. Laura I. Langbein, 2000. "Ownership, empowerment, and productivity: Some empirical evidence on the causes and consequences of employee discretion," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 19(3), pages 427-449.
    11. Dorothy M. Daley & Megan Mullin & Meghan E. Rubado, 2014. "State Agency Discretion in a Delegated Federal Program: Evidence from Drinking Water Investment," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, Oxford University Press, vol. 44(4), pages 564-586.

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