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Trust in a national anti-corruption agency: A survey experiment among citizens and experts

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  • Monnery, Benjamin
  • Chirat, Alexandre

Abstract

Are anti-corruption agencies able to secure public trust, promote public integrity and fight political corruption in the eyes of the general public? The paper investigates this question by focusing on France, which became a leader in the fight against corruption after the launch in 2013 of the High Authority for the Transparency in Public Life (HATVP). We run a survey experiment among 3000 citizens and 33 experts to collect their prior beliefs about political corruption, and then evaluate the impact of granting information about the track record of the national agency on citizens' perceptions of its effectiveness and legitimacy. The paper provides four main results. First, as expected, information provision has meaningful and positive impacts on citizens’ perceptions of the HATVP, political transparency, and representative democracy. Second, while most beneficial impacts are broad-based, treatment effects are as large or even larger among the most poorly informed and distrustful citizens. Third, the experiment points toward the existence of a modest “integrity paradox”, i.e., an increase in the salience or perceived severity of corruption when citizens are better informed about the anti-corruption agency. Fourth, information provision reduces the divergence of opinions between the average citizen and experts about the effectiveness of the HATVP and the dynamics of political integrity.

Suggested Citation

  • Monnery, Benjamin & Chirat, Alexandre, 2024. "Trust in a national anti-corruption agency: A survey experiment among citizens and experts," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:85:y:2024:i:c:s0176268024000946
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102592
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Political corruption; Political trust; Anti-corruption agency; Integrity; Populism; Survey experiment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C99 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Other
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • M48 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • P37 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Legal

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