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Contagious Dishonesty: Corruption Scandals and Supermarket Theft

Author

Listed:
  • Giorgio Gulino
  • Federico Masera

Abstract

Is dishonest behavior contagious? We answer this question by studying whether corruption scandals affect the propensity of supermarket customers to steal while using a self-service checkout system. Crucially, this system allows shoppers to engage in dishonest behavior by underreporting the value of their shopping cart. Exploiting data from random audits on shoppers, we show that the probability of stealing increases by 16 percent after a local corruption scandal breaks. This effect is not driven by any change in material incentives. Suggestive evidence shows that it is driven by a reduction in the self-imposed cost of stealing.

Suggested Citation

  • Giorgio Gulino & Federico Masera, 2023. "Contagious Dishonesty: Corruption Scandals and Supermarket Theft," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 15(4), pages 218-251, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejapp:v:15:y:2023:i:4:p:218-51
    DOI: 10.1257/app.20210446
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. F. Angei, 2025. "Silent alarms: workplace injuries under-reporting in Italy," Working Paper CRENoS 202503, Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia.
    2. Goerg, Sebastian J. & Himmler, Oliver & König, Tobias, 2024. "Norm violations and behavioral spillovers—Evidence from the lab and the field," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 166(C).
    3. Patrice Bougette & Oliver Budzinski & Frédéric Marty, 2025. "In the light of dynamic competition: should we make merger remedies more flexible?," European Competition Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(3), pages 505-530, September.
    4. Monnery, Benjamin & Chirat, Alexandre, 2024. "Trust in a national anti-corruption agency: A survey experiment among citizens and experts," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).
    5. Chen, Liwen & Chung, Bobby W. & Wang, Guanghua, 2025. "Composition of peer mothers and gender norms: Class randomization and short-run effects," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 234(C).
    6. Benjamin Monnery & Alexandre Chirat, 2024. "Trust in the Fight Against Political Corruption: A Survey Experiment among Citizens and Experts," Working Papers AFED 24-02, Association Francaise d'Economie du Droit (AFED).
    7. Benjamin Monnery & Alexandre Chirat, 2023. "Trust in the fight against political corruption: A survey experiment among citizens and experts," EconomiX Working Papers 2023-11, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    8. Miriam Venturini, 2023. "The Imperfect Union: Labor Racketeering, Corruption Exposure, and Its Consequences," Working Papers 202407, University of California at Riverside, Department of Economics.
    9. Sardoschau, Sulin & Gulino, Giorgio & Masera, Federico, 2025. "Identity Under Scrutiny: Media Attention and Rule Compliance," IZA Discussion Papers 17888, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    10. Bahník, Štěpán & Houdek, Petr & Hudík, Marek & Say, Nicolas, 2025. "The limited role of prosocial behavior in preventing others from being dishonest," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 117(C).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D12 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • L81 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification

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