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Critiques de trois arguments justifiant les lois sur le financement de la vie politique

  • François Facchini

    ()

    (EDJ - Université de Reims - Champagne Ardenne, LAEP - LAboratoire d'Economie Publique - Université Paris I - Panthéon-Sorbonne)

Cet article soutient que les lois sur le financement de la vie politique en France sont fondées sur de mauvais arguments. Il soutient que la corruption ne s'explique pas par l'absence de lois sur le financement de la vie politique mais par la valeur des mandats(2), que les inégalités devant le succès électoral ne s'expliquent pas par le montant des dépenses de campagne mais par les résultats économiques des politiques publiques et le capital politique des candidats (3), et que l'action des groupes de pression ne remet pas en cause la sincérité du scrutin parce que le don ne doit pas simplement être pensé comme un acte d'investissement mais aussi comme un acte de consommation (4).

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) with number hal-00270469.

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Date of creation: 2004
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Publication status: Published, Politiques et Management public, 2004, 25, décembre, 27-46
Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-00270469
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00270469
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/

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  1. Palda, Kristian S, 1975. "The Effect of Expenditure on Political Success: Reply," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 779-80, December.
  2. Harold Demsetz, 1981. "Barriers to Entry," UCLA Economics Working Papers 192, UCLA Department of Economics.
  3. Crain, William Mark & Tollison, Robert D, 1976. "Campaign Expenditures and Political Competition," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(1), pages 177-88, April.
  4. Lott, John R, Jr, 1987. "Licensing and Nontransferable Rents," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 453-55, June.
  5. Laband, David N & Lentz, Bernard F, 1985. "Favorite Sons: Intergenerational Wealth Transfers among Politicians," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 23(3), pages 395-414, July.
  6. Palda, Kristian S, 1975. "The Effect of Expenditure on Political Success," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 745-71, December.
  7. Helpman Elhanan & Persson Torsten, 2001. "Lobbying and Legislative Bargaining," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 1-33, November.
  8. Crain, W Mark & Deaton, Thomas H & Tollison, Robert D, 1977. "Legislators as Taxicabs: On the Value of Seats in the U.S. House of Representatives," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 15(2), pages 298-302, April.
  9. Morris Coats, R. & Dalton, Thomas R., 1992. "Entry barriers in politics and uncontested elections," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 75-90, October.
  10. Lott, John R, Jr, 2000. "A Simple Explanation for Why Campaign Expenditures Are Increasing: The Government Is Getting Bigger," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(2), pages 359-93, October.
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