Political Economy of Fiscal Institutions
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Andrea Rieck & Ludger Schuknecht, 2017. "Preserving Government Solvency: A Global Policy Perspective," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 14(4), pages 71-81, 02.
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More about this item
Keywordselectoral systems; fiscal rules; budgeting processes;
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- H61 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Budget; Budget Systems
- H62 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Deficit; Surplus
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-CBA-2006-07-15 (Central Banking)
- NEP-CDM-2006-07-15 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-PBE-2006-07-15 (Public Economics)
- NEP-PKE-2006-07-15 (Post Keynesian Economics)
- NEP-POL-2006-07-15 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-PUB-2006-07-15 (Public Finance)
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