The Sound of Silence: Anti-Defamation Law and Political Corruption
Voters use the press to keep politicians accountable. By endogenizing the response of the voters, this paper provides a theoretical foundation to disentangle the effects of media regulation on corruption and clarify under which circumstances regulation reduces or increases corruption. The analysis shows that libel laws can reduce political corruption only if the moral hazard problem dominates adverse selection and the punishment for the defamer is large enough to deter the publication of well-founded scandals. In this case, libel laws act as a substitute for an optimal re-election rule to which voters commit ex ante.
|Date of creation:||Apr 2013|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Australian School of Business Building, Sydney 2052|
Fax: +61)-2- 9313- 6337
Web page: http://www.economics.unsw.edu.au/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Brunetti, Aymo & Weder, Beatrice, 2003. "A free press is bad news for corruption," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(7-8), pages 1801-1824, August.
- Freille, Sebastian & Haque, M. Emranul & Kneller, Richard, 2007. "A contribution to the empirics of press freedom and corruption," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 838-862, December.
- Suphachol Suphachalasai, 2005.
"Bureaucratic Corruption and Mass Media,"
- Suphachol Suphachalasai, 2005. "Bureaucratic Corruption and Mass Media," Environmental Economy and Policy Research Working Papers 05.2005, University of Cambridge, Department of Land Economics, revised 2005.
- Francesco Drago & Tommaso Nannicini & Francesco Sobbrio, 2014. "Meet the Press: How Voters and Politicians Respond to Newspaper Entry and Exit," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(3), pages 159-188, July.
- Drago, Francesco & Nannicini, Tommaso & Sobbrio, Francesco, 2013. "Meet the Press: How Voters and Politicians Respond to Newspaper Entry and Exit," IZA Discussion Papers 7169, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Warren, Patrick L., 2012. "Independent auditors, bias, and political agency," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 78-88.
- Goltsman, Maria & Hörner, Johannes & Pavlov, Gregory & Squintani, Francesco, 2009. "Mediation, arbitration and negotiation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1397-1420, July.
- Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 181-214, Fall. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:swe:wpaper:2012-21a. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Hongyi Li)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.