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Should we trust the gatekeepers?: Auditors' and lawyers' liability for clients' misconduct

  • Ganuza, Juan Jose
  • Gomez, Fernando
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    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V7M-4NF4F4M-3/2/d8fb6026dc0f4f0bd604f7cdff32ddae
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    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal International Review of Law and Economics.

    Volume (Year): 27 (2007)
    Issue (Month): 1 (March)
    Pages: 96-109

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:27:y:2007:i:1:p:96-109
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/irle

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    1. Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 181-214, Fall.
    2. Kofman, F. & Lawarree, J., 1990. "Collusion in Hierarchical Agency," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington 91-01, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
    3. Baker, George P, 1992. "Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 598-614, June.
    4. Goldberg, Victor P, 1988. "Accountable Accountants: Is Third-Party Liability Necessary?," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(2), pages 295-312, June.
    5. Kofman, F. & Lawarree, J., 1993. "On the Optimality of Allowing Collusion," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington 93-02, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
    6. Ralf Ewert & Eberhard Feess & Martin Nell, 2000. "Auditor liability rules under imperfect information and costly litigation: the welfare-increasing effect of liability insurance," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 9(3), pages 371-385.
    7. Coffee, John C., 2004. "Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt13d8s2qs, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
    8. Kraakman, Reiner H, 1986. "Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(1), pages 53-104, Spring.
    9. Juan José Ganuza & Fernando Gómez, 2002. "Caution, children crossing: Heterogeneity of victim's cost of care and negligence rule," Economics Working Papers 666, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    10. Villadsen, Bente, 1995. "Communication and delegation in collusive agencies," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2-3), pages 315-344, April.
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