The Sound of Silence: Anti-Defamation Law and Political Corruption
I study a model of political agency where a media firm plays a monitoring role between the electorate and the politician. The analysis focuses on the design of a legal framework for the press such that corruption is minimized. I find that an antidefamation law punishing media that publish false scandals reduces corruption only if (i) the punishment for the defamer is large enough to deter the publication of some true scandals and (ii) the electorate can punish the politician when no scandal is published.
|Date of creation:||Mar 2012|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Australian School of Business Building, Sydney 2052|
Fax: +61)-2- 9313- 6337
Web page: http://www.economics.unsw.edu.au/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Claudio Ferraz & Frederico Finan, 2008.
"Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil's Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 123(2), pages 703-745.
- Ferraz, Claudio & Finan, Frederico S., 2007. "Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil’s Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes," IZA Discussion Papers 2836, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Drago, Francesco & Nannicini, Tommaso & Sobbrio, Francesco, 2013.
"Meet the Press: How Voters and Politicians Respond to Newspaper Entry and Exit,"
IZA Discussion Papers
7169, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Francesco Drago & Tommaso Nannicini & Francesco Sobbrio, 2014. "Meet the Press: How Voters and Politicians Respond to Newspaper Entry and Exit," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(3), pages 159-188, July.
- Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 181-214, Fall.
- Brunetti, Aymo & Weder, Beatrice, 2003. "A free press is bad news for corruption," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(7-8), pages 1801-1824, August.
- Matthew Gentzkow & Jesse Shapiro, 2005.
"Media Bias and Reputation,"
NBER Working Papers
11664, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Suphachol Suphachalasai, 2005.
"Bureaucratic Corruption and Mass Media,"
Environmental Economy and Policy Research Working Papers
05.2005, University of Cambridge, Department of Land Economics, revised 2005.
- Goltsman, Maria & Hörner, Johannes & Pavlov, Gregory & Squintani, Francesco, 2009. "Mediation, arbitration and negotiation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1397-1420, July.
- Warren, Patrick L., 2012. "Independent auditors, bias, and political agency," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 78-88.
- Freille, Sebastian & Haque, M. Emranul & Kneller, Richard, 2007. "A contribution to the empirics of press freedom and corruption," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 838-862, December.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:swe:wpaper:2012-21. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Hongyi Li)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.