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Disobedience and Authority

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  • Marino, Anthony M.
  • Matsusaka, John G.
  • Zabojnik, Jan

Abstract

This paper presents a theory of the allocation of authority in an organization in which centralization is limited by the agent’s ability to disobey the principal. We show that workers are given more authority when they are costly to replace or do not mind looking for another job, even if they have no better information than the principal. The allocation of authority thus depends on external market conditions as well as the information and agency problems emphasized in the literature. Evidence from a national survey of organizations shows that worker autonomy is related to separation costs as the theory predicts.

Suggested Citation

  • Marino, Anthony M. & Matsusaka, John G. & Zabojnik, Jan, 2006. "Disobedience and Authority," Queen's Economics Department Working Papers 273585, Queen's University - Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:quedwp:273585
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.273585
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