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Optimal Institutional Structure of Competition Authorities Under Reputation Maximization: A Model and Empirical Evidence from the Case of Russia

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  • S. Avdasheva

    () (National Research University Higher School of Economics)

  • S. Golovanova

    () (National Research University Higher School of Economics (Nizhniy Novgorod Campus))

  • Y. Katsoulacos

    () (Athens University of Economics and Business)

Abstract

We contribute to the debate on the optimal structure of Competition Authorities (CAs), a debate of particular relevance in younger developing country jurisdictions. We propose a model of a reputation-maximizing CA in which reputation is increasing with enforcement success. This predicts that generalist CAs will focus on decisions in activities with low probability of annulment and low investigation and litigation costs and that this could be detrimental to welfare (relative to the more balanced activity portfolio of specialist CAs). We use a data set of appealed decisions of the Russian CA to provide an empirical support for the model’s assumptions and predictions.

Suggested Citation

  • S. Avdasheva & S. Golovanova & Y. Katsoulacos, 2019. "Optimal Institutional Structure of Competition Authorities Under Reputation Maximization: A Model and Empirical Evidence from the Case of Russia," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 54(2), pages 251-282, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:54:y:2019:i:2:d:10.1007_s11151-018-9640-1
    DOI: 10.1007/s11151-018-9640-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Eduardo Pontual Ribeiro & Svetlana Golovanova, 2020. "A Unified Presentation Of Competition Analysis In Two‐Sided Markets," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 34(3), pages 548-571, July.
    2. Avdasheva, Svetlana & Golovanova, Svetlana & Katsoulacos, Yannis, 2019. "The role of judicial review in developing evidentiary standards: The example of market analysis in Russian competition law enforcement," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 101-114.

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