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Determinants of the Duration of European Appellate Court Proceedings in Cartel Cases

Author

Listed:
  • Florian Smuda

    (ZEW Centre for European Economic Research
    MaCCI Mannheim Centre for Competition and Innovation)

  • Patrice Bougette

    (University of Nice Sophia Antipolis, France
    GREDEG CNRS
    LAMETA CNRS)

  • Kai Hüschelrath

    (ZEW Centre for European Economic Research
    MaCCI Mannheim Centre for Competition and Innovation)

Abstract

The duration of appellate court proceedings is an important determinant of the efficiency of a court system. We use data of 234 firm groups that participated in 63 cartels convicted by the European Commission between 2000 and 2012 to investigate the determinants of the duration of the subsequent one- or two-stage appeals process. We find that while the speed of the first-stage appellate court decision depends on the court’s appeals-related workload, the complexity of the case, the degree of cooperation by the firms involved and the clarity of the applied rules and regulations, the second-stage appellate court proceedings appear to be largely unaffected by those drivers. We take our empirical results to derive conclusions for both firms that plan to file an appeal as well as public policy makers.

Suggested Citation

  • Florian Smuda & Patrice Bougette & Kai Hüschelrath, 2014. "Determinants of the Duration of European Appellate Court Proceedings in Cartel Cases," GREDEG Working Papers 2014-25, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.
    • Handle: RePEc:gre:wpaper:2014-25
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    5. Theodore Eisenberg & Henry S. Farber, 2013. "Why Do Plaintiffs Lose Appeals? Biased Trial Courts, Litigious Losers, or Low Trial Win Rates?," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 15(1), pages 73-109.
    6. Michael R. Baye & Joshua D. Wright, 2011. "Is Antitrust Too Complicated for Generalist Judges? The Impact of Economic Complexity and Judicial Training on Appeals," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 54(1), pages 1-24.
    7. Hüschelrath, Kai & Laitenberger, Ulrich & Smuda, Florian, 2012. "Cartel enforcement in the European Union: Determinants of the duration of investigations," ZEW Discussion Papers 12-071, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    8. Martin Carree & Andrea Günster & Maarten Schinkel, 2010. "European Antitrust Policy 1957–2004: An Analysis of Commission Decisions," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 36(2), pages 97-131, March.
    9. Santolino, Miguel, 2010. "Determinants of the decision to appeal against motor bodily injury judgements made by Spanish trial courts," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 37-45, March.
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    11. Steven Shavell, 2006. "The Appeals Process and Adjudicator Incentives," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(1), pages 1-29, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Duy Vu & Michele Pezzoni & Duc Lam Nguyen, 2021. "Arbitrator teams and dispute resolution performance: an empirical analysis," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 51(2), pages 347-381, April.
    2. Sven Heim & Kai Hüschelrath & Ulrich Laitenberger, 2016. "The Duration of the EC Merger Control Process: Determinants and the Impact of the 2004 Merger Regulation Reform," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(1), pages 37-62, February.
    3. Hans W. Friederiszick, & Linda Gratz, & Michael Rauber,, 2019. "The impact of EU cartel policy reforms on the timing of settlements in private follow-on damages disputes: An empirical assessment of cases from 2001 to 2015," ESMT Research Working Papers ESMT-19-03, ESMT European School of Management and Technology.
    4. Polemis, Michael, 2024. "Are Cartels Forever? Global Evidence Using Quantile Regression Analysis," MPRA Paper 120534, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Hellwig, Michael & Hüschelrath, Kai, 2016. "Cartel cases and the cartel enforcement process in the European Union 2001-2015: A quantitative assessment," ZEW Discussion Papers 16-063, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    6. S. Avdasheva & S. Golovanova & Y. Katsoulacos, 2019. "Optimal Institutional Structure of Competition Authorities Under Reputation Maximization: A Model and Empirical Evidence from the Case of Russia," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 54(2), pages 251-282, March.
    7. Hüschelrath, Kai & Laitenberger, Ulrich, 2015. "The settlement procedure in EC cartel cases: An empirical assesment," ZEW Discussion Papers 15-064, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    8. Hans W. Friederiszick & Linda Gratz & Michael Rauber, 2019. "The impact of EU cartel policy reforms on the timing of settlements in private follow-on damages disputes: An empirical assessment of cases from 2001 to 2015," ESMT Research Working Papers ESMT-19-03_R1, ESMT European School of Management and Technology, revised 25 Jun 2020.
    9. Moritz Birgit & Becker Martin & Schmidtchen Dieter, 2018. "Measuring the Deterrent Effect of European Cartel Law Enforcement," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 18(3), pages 1-27, July.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Law and economics; antitrust policy; cartels; appeals; European Union;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

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