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Why Do Plaintiffs Lose Appeals? Biased Trial Courts, Litigious Losers, or Low Trial Win Rates?

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  • Theodore Eisenberg
  • Henry S. Farber

Abstract

Multiple studies find that plaintiffs who lose at trial and subsequently appeal are less successful on appeal than are losing defendants who appeal. The studies attribute this to a perception by appellate judges that trial courts are biased in favor of plaintiffs. However, at least two alternative explanations exist. First, losing plaintiffs may appeal at higher rates independent of the potential merits. Second, if plaintiffs tend to pursue to trial lawsuits where they should win on the merits less than half the time, then potentially reversible outcomes at trial will be more likely to be adverse to defendants. This study revisits the analysis of the appellate process with a statistical model that ties together win rates at trial, appeals rates, and success rates on appeal. The model can distinguish the competing explanations for differential appellate success rates, and we estimate this model using matched data on Federal District Court trials and appeals to the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal. We find consistent evidence that the lower plaintiff success rate on appeal is due to plaintiffs' pursuing lawsuits where they should win on the merits (which we define to be an outcome that would not be reversed or remanded on appeal) less than half the time. We find no evidence that asymmetric success on appeal is attributable either to trial courts favoring plaintiffs or to higher rates of appeal by losing plaintiffs. Copyright 2013, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Theodore Eisenberg & Henry S. Farber, 2013. "Why Do Plaintiffs Lose Appeals? Biased Trial Courts, Litigious Losers, or Low Trial Win Rates?," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 15(1), pages 73-109.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:amlawe:v:15:y:2013:i:1:p:73-109
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/aler/ahs021
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    Cited by:

    1. Michael Hellwig & Kai Hüschelrath & Ulrich Laitenberger, 2018. "Settlements and Appeals in the European Commission’s Cartel Cases: An Empirical Assessment," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 52(1), pages 55-84, February.
    2. Hüschelrath, Kai & Smuda, Florian, 2014. "The appeals process: An empirical assessment," ZEW Discussion Papers 14-063, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    3. Pierre Bentata & Romain Espinosa & Yolande Hiriart, 2019. "Correction Activities by France’s Supreme Courts and Control over their Dockets," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 129(2), pages 169-204.
    4. Christina L. Boyd, 2015. "The Hierarchical Influence of Courts of Appeals on District Courts," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 44(1), pages 113-141.
    5. Kai Hüschelrath & Florian Smuda, 2016. "The Appeals Process in the European Commission's Cartel Cases: An Empirical Assessment," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 13(2), pages 330-357, June.
    6. Florian Smuda & Patrice Bougette & Kai Hüschelrath, 2015. "Determinants of the Duration of European Appellate Court Proceedings in Cartel Cases," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(6), pages 1352-1369, November.
    7. Pierre Bentata & Yolande Hiriart, 2015. "Biased Judges: Evidence from French Environmental Cases," Working Papers hal-01377922, HAL.
    8. David Gliksberg, 2014. "Does the Law Matter? Win Rates and Law Reforms," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 11(2), pages 378-407, June.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General
    • K19 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Other
    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process

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