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Tactical dilatory practice in litigation: Evidence from EC merger proceedings

  • Ormosi, Peter L.
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    The economic analysis of delay in legal procedures has received considerable attention in the past. Some of these works focus on the determinants of delay in litigation but very little analysis has been dedicated to examining if tactical delay may actually help the settlement process. The paper shows that in European merger litigation merging parties may decide to tactically challenge discovery attempts, which causes a delay that is strategically used to gain more time to take the necessary steps to avoid a lengthy in-depth investigation. This type of delay can be beneficial to both merging parties and could also contribute to the saving of regulatory resources, and reduce the risks threatening the success of a potentially efficiency enhancing merger.

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    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal International Review of Law and Economics.

    Volume (Year): 32 (2012)
    Issue (Month): 4 ()
    Pages: 370-377

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:32:y:2012:i:4:p:370-377
    DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2012.08.002
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    1. Bertrand Chopard & Thomas Cortade & Eric Langlais, 2008. "Trial and settlement negotiations between asymmetrically skilled parties," EconomiX Working Papers 2008-32, University of Paris West - Nanterre la Défense, EconomiX.
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    6. Miceli, Thomas J., 1999. "Settlement delay as a sorting device," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 265-274, June.
    7. Jean-Philippe Tropeano & Andreea Cosnita, 2009. "Negotiating remedies: Revealing the merger efficiency gains," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00643693, HAL.
    8. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 1984. "Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(3), pages 404-415, Autumn.
    9. Gary M. Fournier & Thomas W. Zuehlke, 1996. "The Timing of Out-of-Court Settlements," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(2), pages 310-321, Summer.
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