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Legal expenses insurance, risk aversion and litigation

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  • Heyes, Anthony
  • Rickman, Neil
  • Tzavara, Dionisia

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  • Heyes, Anthony & Rickman, Neil & Tzavara, Dionisia, 2004. "Legal expenses insurance, risk aversion and litigation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 107-119, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:24:y:2004:i:1:p:107-119
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kathryn E. Spier, 1992. "The Dynamics of Pretrial Negotiation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(1), pages 93-108.
    2. Rickman, Neil, 1994. "The Economics of Contingency Fees in Personal Injury Litigation," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(1), pages 34-50, Spring.
    3. Dana, James D, Jr & Spier, Kathryn E, 1993. "Expertise and Contingent Fees: The Role of Asymmetric Information in Attorney Compensation," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 9(2), pages 349-367, October.
    4. Phillips, Jenny & Hawkins, Keith & Flemming, John S, 1975. "Compensation for Personal Injuries," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 85(337), pages 129-134, March.
    5. Gravelle, Hugh & Waterson, Michael, 1993. "No Win, No Fee: Some Economics of Contingent Legal Fees," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 103(420), pages 1205-1220, September.
    6. Roland Kirstein, 2000. "Risk Neutrality and Strategic Insurance," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 25(2), pages 251-261, April.
    7. Phillips, Jenny & Hawkins, Keith & Flemming, John S, 1975. "Compensation for Personal Injuries-A Reply," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 85(338), pages 392-394, June.
    8. Farmer, Amy & Pecorino, Paul, 1994. "Pretrial negotiations with asymmetric information on risk preferences," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 273-281, September.
    9. Halpern, P. J. & Turnbull, S. M., 1983. "Legal fees contracts and alternative cost rules: An economic analysis," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 3-26, June.
    10. Ehrlich, Isaac & Becker, Gary S, 1972. "Market Insurance, Self-Insurance, and Self-Protection," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 80(4), pages 623-648, July-Aug..
    11. Fenn, Paul & Rickman, Neil, 1999. "Delay and Settlement in Litigation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(457), pages 476-491, July.
    12. Jennifer F. Reinganum & Louise L. Wilde, 1986. "Settlement, Litigation, and the Allocation of Litigation Costs," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(4), pages 557-566, Winter.
    13. Daughety, Andrew F. & Reinganum, Jennifer F., 1994. "Settlement negotiations with two-sided asymmetric information: Model duality, information distribution, and efficiency," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 283-298, September.
    14. Daniel F. Rubinfeld & Suzanne Scotchmer, 1993. "Contingent Fees for Attorneys: An Economic Analysis," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 24(3), pages 343-356, Autumn.
    15. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 1984. "Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(3), pages 404-415, Autumn.
    16. Rubinstein, Ariel & Safra, Zvi & Thomson, William, 1992. "On the Interpretation of the Nash Bargaining Solution and Its Extension to Non-expected Utility Preferences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 1171-1186, September.
    17. Swanson, Timothy & Mason, Robin, 1998. "Nonbargaining in the shadow of the law," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 121-140, June.
    18. Gravelle, H. S. E., 1990. "Rationing trials by waiting: Welfare implications," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 255-270, December.
    19. Patricia Munch Danzon, 1983. "Contingent Fees for Personal Injury Litigation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(1), pages 213-224, Spring.
    20. Urs Schweizer, 1989. "Litigation and Settlement under Two-Sided Incomplete Information," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 56(2), pages 163-177.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. J.J. Prescott & Kathryn E. Spier & Albert Yoon, 2014. "Trial and Settlement: A Study of High-Low Agreements," NBER Working Papers 19873, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Anne Duchêne, 2015. "Patent Litigation Insurance," Working Papers 2015-621, Department of Research, Ipag Business School.
    3. Anne Duchêne, 2017. "Patent Litigation Insurance," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 84(2), pages 631-660, June.
    4. Qiao Yue, 2010. "Legal-Expenses Insurance and Settlement," Asian Journal of Law and Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 1-19, July.
    5. Lydie Ancelot & Cornel Oros, 2015. "Physician–patient relationship and medical accident victim compensation: some insights into the French regulatory system," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 16(5), pages 529-542, June.
    6. Jorge Lemus & Emil Temnyalov, 2020. "Pay-for-Delay with Follow-On Products," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 56(4), pages 697-714, June.
    7. Baik, Kyung Hwan & Kim, In-Gyu, 2007. "Contingent fees versus legal expenses insurance," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 351-361, September.
    8. Buzzacchi, Luigi & Scellato, Giuseppe, 2008. "Patent litigation insurance and R&D incentives," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 272-286, December.
    9. Deffains, Bruno & Desrieux, Claudine, 2015. "To litigate or not to litigate? The impacts of third-party financing on litigation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 178-189.
    10. Qiao, Yue, 2013. "Legal effort and optimal legal expenses insurance," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 179-189.

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