To litigate or not to litigate? The impacts of third-party financing on litigation
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- Landeo, Claudia M. & Nikitin, Maxim, 2018.
"Financially-constrained lawyers: An economic theory of legal disputes,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 625-647.
- Landeo, Claudia & Nikitin, Maxim, 2018. "Financially-Constrained Lawyers: An Economic Theory of Legal Disputes," Working Papers 2018-3, University of Alberta, Department of Economics.
More about this item
KeywordsThird-party financing; Litigation financing; Frivolous claims; Transaction costs;
- K0 - Law and Economics - - General
- K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
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