Do Contingent Fees Promote Excessive Litigation?
No abstract is available for this item.
- Winand Emons & Nuno Garoupa, 2004.
"The Economics of US-style Contingent Fees and UK-style Conditional Fees,"
dp0407, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
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- Emons, Winand, 2000. "Expertise, contingent fees, and insufficient attorney effort," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 21-33, March.
- Gabuthy Yannick & Lambert Eve-Angéline, 2011. "English Rule and Frivolous Suits: Conditional versus Hourly Fees," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 72-85, April.
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