Institutional Causes of Delay in the Settlement of Legal Disputes
Social costs created by delay in the resolution of legal disputes have motivated an extensive theoretical literature studying the causes of delay. However, much less work has investigated a related, more policy-relevant question: how do legal institutions empirically affect delay in settlement? Based on analysis of the timing of settlement of automobile bodily injury insurance claims, I present two major findings on this topic. First, delay in trial courts increases delay in settlement. Second, state tort laws designed to reduce delay in settlement do not work as intended. Reforms imposing prejudgment interest, which were designed to reduce delay, actually increase delay in settlement, controlling for other state-level institutional factors and the characteristics of claims. Copyright 1996 by Oxford University Press.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Volume (Year): 12 (1996)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK|
Fax: 01865 267 985
Web page: http://jleo.oupjournals.org/
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.oup.co.uk/journals|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:12:y:1996:i:2:p:432-60. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.