IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Institutional Causes of Delay in the Settlement of Legal Disputes

  • Kessler, Daniel
Registered author(s):

    Social costs created by delay in the resolution of legal disputes have motivated an extensive theoretical literature studying the causes of delay. However, much less work has investigated a related, more policy-relevant question: how do legal institutions empirically affect delay in settlement? Based on analysis of the timing of settlement of automobile bodily injury insurance claims, I present two major findings on this topic. First, delay in trial courts increases delay in settlement. Second, state tort laws designed to reduce delay in settlement do not work as intended. Reforms imposing prejudgment interest, which were designed to reduce delay, actually increase delay in settlement, controlling for other state-level institutional factors and the characteristics of claims. Copyright 1996 by Oxford University Press.

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Journal of Law, Economics and Organization.

    Volume (Year): 12 (1996)
    Issue (Month): 2 (October)
    Pages: 432-60

    as
    in new window

    Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:12:y:1996:i:2:p:432-60
    Contact details of provider: Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK
    Fax: 01865 267 985
    Web page: http://jleo.oupjournals.org/
    Email:

    Order Information: Web: http://www.oup.co.uk/journals

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:12:y:1996:i:2:p:432-60. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press)

    or (Christopher F. Baum)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.