The Redistricting of Public Prosecutors' Offices
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More about this item
KeywordsCaseload; prosecutor; redistricting;
- H00 - Public Economics - - General - - - General
- K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
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