The Redistricting of Public Prosecutors' Offices
We analyze the possible impact of re-organizing multiple prosecutors' offices on 'prosecutorial output': merging multiple districts saves on a state's expenditures but the impact on the criminal justice is ambiguous and depends on whether scale efficiencies make up for the diminished resources spent per capita. Data from North Caroline's recent experience with expanding the number of offices is used to test whether scale efficiencies make up for lowered output by looking at the impact of redistricting on multiple measures of prosecutorial output. The evidence suggests that the reorganization creating smaller districts reduced prosecutorial output. This indicates that perhaps consolidation of prosecutorial districts has has been recently suggested will not only lower public expenditure but because of economics of scale may actually lead to enhanced prosecution.
|Date of creation:||May 2011|
|Date of revision:|
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