How to Gerrymander: A Formal Analysis
This paper combines the optimal gerrymandering approach in political science with the 'fair cake division' results in mathematics and economics to consider optimal partisan gerrymandering schemes on a given territory. The author analyzes existence and properties of an optimal districting map for a strategic party that has control over redistricting process, given arbitrary continuous distributions of voters and party supporters over the electoral territory. Interestingly, she finds that imposition of certain equality-type constraints on districting might often help to prevent gerrymandering and sustain fairness. Copyright 1998 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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- Brams, S.J. & Taylor, A.D., 1992. "An Envy-Free Cake Division Algorithm," Working Papers 92-31, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- Berliant, Marcus & Thomson, William & Dunz, Karl, 1992. "On the fair division of a heterogeneous commodity," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 201-216.
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