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How to Gerrymander: A Formal Analysis

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  • Sherstyuk, Katerina

Abstract

This paper combines the optimal gerrymandering approach in political science with the 'fair cake division' results in mathematics and economics to consider optimal partisan gerrymandering schemes on a given territory. The author analyzes existence and properties of an optimal districting map for a strategic party that has control over redistricting process, given arbitrary continuous distributions of voters and party supporters over the electoral territory. Interestingly, she finds that imposition of certain equality-type constraints on districting might often help to prevent gerrymandering and sustain fairness. Copyright 1998 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Sherstyuk, Katerina, 1998. "How to Gerrymander: A Formal Analysis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 95(1-2), pages 27-49, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:95:y:1998:i:1-2:p:27-49
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    Cited by:

    1. Wolfgang Pesendorfer & Faruk Gul, 2007. "Strategic Redistricting," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000351, UCLA Department of Economics.
    2. repec:lan:wpaper:1711 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Stephen Coate & Brian Knight, 2007. "Socially Optimal Districting: A Theoretical and Empirical Exploration," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 122(4), pages 1409-1471.
    4. Faruk Gul & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2010. "Strategic Redistricting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(4), pages 1616-1641, September.
    5. Corbett A. Grainger, 2010. "Redistricting and Polarization: Who Draws the Lines in California?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(3), pages 545-567.
    6. repec:lan:wpaper:1815 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Andrei Gomberg & Romans Pancs & Tridib Sharma, 2023. "Electoral Maldistricting," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 64(3), pages 1223-1264, August.
    8. Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Bryan C McCannon, 2011. "The Redistricting of Public Prosecutors' Offices," Discussion Papers 11-13, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
    9. Kai Hao Yang & Alexander K. Zentefis, 2022. "Gerrymandering and the Limits of Representative Democracy," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2328, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    10. Walter Melnik, 2024. "Legislative redistricting and the partisan distribution of transportation expenditure," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 1-29, March.
    11. Stephen Coate & Brian Knight, 2005. "Socially Optimal Districting," NBER Working Papers 11462, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Bracco, Emanuele, 2013. "Optimal districting with endogenous party platforms," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 1-13.
    13. Xiaotie Deng & Qi Qi & Amin Saberi, 2012. "Algorithmic Solutions for Envy-Free Cake Cutting," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 60(6), pages 1461-1476, December.
    14. Puppe, Clemens & Tasnádi, Attila, 2009. "Optimal redistricting under geographical constraints: Why "pack and crack" does not work," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 105(1), pages 93-96, October.
    15. Faruk Gul & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2007. "Competitive Redistricting," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000748, UCLA Department of Economics.
    16. Kyle Gatesman & James Unwin, 2018. "Lattice Studies of Gerrymandering Strategies," Papers 1808.02826, arXiv.org.
    17. Thomas Gilligan & John Matsusaka, 2006. "Public choice principles of redistricting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(3), pages 381-398, December.
    18. repec:lan:wpaper:1932 is not listed on IDEAS
    19. repec:lan:wpaper:616564 is not listed on IDEAS

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