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Why the Japanese Taxpayer Always Loses

Author

Listed:
  • J. Mark Ramseyer

    (Harvard Law School)

  • Eric Rasmusen

    (Indiana University, Kelley School of Business)

Abstract

The tax office wins most cases in Japan. We think about why this might be. We find that although judges who rule in favor of the taxpayer do not suffer in their future careers, if the loser-- whether governemnt or taxpayer--appeals and wins, the reversed judge's career does take a turn for the worse. This implies that the government cares more about accurate judging than about pro-government judging.

Suggested Citation

  • J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric Rasmusen, 1999. "Why the Japanese Taxpayer Always Loses," Law and Economics 9907003, EconWPA.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwple:9907003
    Note: Type of Document - Pdf; prepared on IBM PC ; to print on ;
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    File URL: https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/le/papers/9907/9907003.pdf
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Padovano, Fabio & Fiorino, Nadia, 2012. "Strategic delegation and “judicial couples” in the Italian Constitutional Court," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 215-223.
    2. Pushkar Maitra & Russell Smyth, 2004. "Judicial Independence, Judicial Promotion and the Enforcement of Legislative Wealth Transfers—An Empirical Study of the New Zealand High Court," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 209-235, March.
    3. Fiorino, Nadia & Gavoille, Nicolas & Padovano, Fabio, 2015. "Rewarding judicial independence: Evidence from the Italian Constitutional Court," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 56-66.
    4. Lars P. Feld & Stefan Voigt, 2004. "Making Judges Independent – Some Proposals Regarding the Judiciary," CESifo Working Paper Series 1260, CESifo Group Munich.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    japan; tax law; judges; political economy;

    JEL classification:

    • J44 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Professional Labor Markets and Occupations
    • J45 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Public Sector Labor Markets
    • K34 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Tax Law
    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism

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