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Careerism and judicial behavior

Author

Listed:
  • Alessandro Melcarne

    (EconomiX - EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

Although often criticized by part of legal scholarship, the idea of judicial behavior being influenced by judges’ egoistic goals simply needs the appropriate institutional setting in order to be validated. In the present paper, the hypothesis of careerism affecting judges’ conduct is investigated with regard to the case of the Italian Constitutional Court, where judges only serve for a limited and non-renewable term of 9 years. This institutional framework allows to reasonably assume on a theoretical level the existence of career concerns among them. In order to maximize the chances of future appointments, judges try to earn as much reputation as possible among relevant audiences. Empirical evidence supports the theory that career concerns push judges to react to incentives that alter the reputational returns of their conduct. This result holds independently of judges’ personal characteristics that might influence their professional concerns.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Alessandro Melcarne, 2017. "Careerism and judicial behavior," Post-Print hal-01611563, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01611563
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    Cited by:

    1. Melcarne, Alessandro & Monnery, Benjamin & Wolff, François-Charles, 2022. "Prosecutors, judges and sentencing disparities: Evidence from traffic offenses in France," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
    2. Melcarne Alessandro & Ramello Giovanni B., 2015. "Judicial Independence, Judges’ Incentives and Efficiency," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(2), pages 149-169, July.
    3. Nicolas Lampach & Arthur Dyevre, 2020. "Choosing for Europe: judicial incentives and legal integration in the European Union," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 65-86, August.
    4. repec:hal:journl:hal-03680153 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Freyens, Benoit Pierre & Gong, Xiaodong, 2020. "Judicial arbitration of unfair dismissal cases: The role of peer effects," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).

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