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Consensus and dissent in the resolution of conflicts of competence by the Spanish Constitutional Court: the role of federalism and ideology

Author

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  • Julio López-Laborda

    (University of Zaragoza)

  • Fernando Rodrigo

    (University of Zaragoza)

  • Eduardo Sanz-Arcega

    (University of Zaragoza)

Abstract

Given the lack of unambiguously constitutional foundations, Spain’s Constitutional Court (TC) has being playing a leading role in building the regulatory framework of the Autonomic State. This paper analyses whether this function is sufficient to explain the level of agreement among TC justices when adopting their resolutions, and in particular, on reaching unanimous rulings. If so, the legalist/federalist model would be a more adequate model to explain the behaviour of TC justices than the other models proposed in the literature on judicial behaviour: the attitudinal and the strategic models. A database has been constructed for this purpose with the 390 positive conflicts of competence between the central government and the autonomous communities resolved by the TC from 1981 to 2017, which have been used to estimate various explanatory models of unanimous rulings. The results obtained show the importance of the legalist/federalist model when attempting to explain unanimity in the Court’s pronouncements, but they also offer evidence that there are other factors that also influence the level of agreement among TC justices, remarkably the ideological ones.

Suggested Citation

  • Julio López-Laborda & Fernando Rodrigo & Eduardo Sanz-Arcega, 2019. "Consensus and dissent in the resolution of conflicts of competence by the Spanish Constitutional Court: the role of federalism and ideology," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 48(3), pages 305-330, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:48:y:2019:i:3:d:10.1007_s10657-019-09631-8
    DOI: 10.1007/s10657-019-09631-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Brian Goff, 2005. "Supreme Court consensus and dissent: Estimating the role of the selection screen," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 122(3), pages 483-499, March.
    2. Julio López-Laborda & Fernando Rodrigo & Eduardo Sanz-Arcega, 2018. "Correction to: Is the Spanish Constitutional Court an instrument of the central government against the Autonomous Communities?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 338-338, September.
    3. Julio López-Laborda & Fernando Rodrigo & Eduardo Sanz-Arcega, 2018. "Is the Spanish Constitutional Court an instrument of the central government against the Autonomous Communities?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 317-337, September.
    4. Nuno Garoupa & Fernando Gomez-Pomar & Veronica Grembi, 2013. "Judging under Political Pressure: An Empirical Analysis of Constitutional Review Voting in the Spanish Constitutional Court," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 29(3), pages 513-534, June.
    5. Gemma Sala, 2014. "Can Courts Make Federalism Work? A Game Theory Approach to Court-Induced Compliance and Defection in Federal Systems," Economies, MDPI, vol. 2(4), pages 1-25, December.
    6. repec:gig:joupla:v:6:y:2014:i:1:p:83-107 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Virginia A. Hettinger & Stefanie A. Lindquist & Wendy L. Martinek, 2004. "Comparing Attitudinal and Strategic Accounts of Dissenting Behavior on the U.S. Courts of Appeals," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 48(1), pages 123-137, January.
    8. Russell Smyth & Paresh Kumar Narayan, 2004. "Hail to the Chief! Leadership and Structural Change in the Level of Consensus on the High Court of Australia," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 1(2), pages 399-427, July.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Alain Marciano & Giovanni Ramello & Hans-Bernd Schaefer, 2020. "Foreword, special issue: economic analysis of litigations 2," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 1-5, August.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Constitutional Court; Conflicts of competence; Unanimity; Federalism; Ideology;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

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