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The German Constitutional Court – Activist, but not Partisan?

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  • Christoph Engel

    (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods)

Abstract

The German Constitutional Court has powers that are no weaker than the powers of the US Supreme Court. Justices are openly selected by the political parties. Nonetheless, public and professional perception are strikingly different. Justices at the German court are not believed to be guided by the policy preferences of the nominating party. This paper uses the complete publicly available data to investigate whether this perception is well-founded. It exploits two independent sources of quasi-random variation to generate causal evidence. There is no smoking gun of ideological influence. Some specifications show, however, that justices nominated by the FDP and the SPD are more activist, even in domains where activism likely runs counter the ideological preferences of these parties.

Suggested Citation

  • Christoph Engel, 2024. "The German Constitutional Court – Activist, but not Partisan?," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2024_04, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    • Handle: RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2024_04
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Christoph Engel, 2021. "Lucky You: Your Case is Heard by a Seasoned Panel – Panel Effects in the German Constitutional Court," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2021_05, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, revised 01 Jun 2022.
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    Keywords

    German Constitutional Court; party influence; ideology; judicial activism; quasirandom variation;
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