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The company they keep: When and why Chinese judges engage in collegiality

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  • Xiaohong Yu
  • Zhaoyang Sun

Abstract

Scholars of law, economics, and political science argue that collegiality matters. Considerable panel effects exist across jurisdictions, and judges compose panels strategically. In China, millions of cases are decided by collegial panels every year; however, little attention has been paid to the issue of collegiality. We offer one of the first empirical inquiries into collegial panels in China. Specifically, when and why do judges engage in collegiality? How does the presiding judge compose a judicial panel? What is the panel effect? Based on 23,564 cases decided by a local court in Beijing, China, from 2015 to 2017, we build a network of judges' collegial behaviors and examine the judges' strategy for panel composition and its potential impact. We argue for an external mechanism of panel effects and provide a strategic account of coalition‐building in a vulnerable environment. For mundane cases, Chinese judges tend to compose panels with junior judges. To some extent, such panels are their comfort zone. When facing complex cases, they tend to step out of their comfort zone and form panels with more capable judges. When doing so, they are also more inclined to make tough decisions, such as ruling against the government in administrative litigation cases and repeated players in civil cases, among others. The study sheds light on judicial politics in China and has the potential to expand our understanding of collective judicial decision‐making in transitional societies.

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  • Xiaohong Yu & Zhaoyang Sun, 2022. "The company they keep: When and why Chinese judges engage in collegiality," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 19(4), pages 936-1002, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:empleg:v:19:y:2022:i:4:p:936-1002
    DOI: 10.1111/jels.12328
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