IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/copoec/v33y2022i4d10.1007_s10602-021-09357-3.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Political inequality, political participation, and support for populist parties

Author

Listed:
  • Kim Leonie Kellermann

    (University of Münster)

Abstract

We theoretically investigate how political abstention among certain social groups encourages populist parties to enter the political stage, trying to absorb inactive voters. We design a two-stage game with two established parties and n voters who jointly determine a taxation policy. The electorate is divided into two groups, the advantaged and the disadvantaged. Voters’ decisions on whether to participate depend on a party’s tax rate proposal and on general party ideology. Effective political participation requires a certain amount of financial, social and intellectual resources to, for example, evaluate party programs or to engage in political discussion. As the disadvantaged are endowed with fewer resources, they lack political efficacy, resulting in less political participation. Consequently, the established parties propose a tax rate which is biased towards the preferences of the advantaged. The unused voter potential among the disadvantaged draws the interest of a populist challenger. To win support from the disadvantaged, the challenger party optimally proposes a respectively biased tax rate, which then works to polarize the political spectrum.Please confirm if the author names are presented accurately and in the correct sequence (given name, middle name/initial, family name). Author 1 Given name: [Kim Leonie] Last name [ Kellermann]. Also, kindly confirm the details in the metadata are correct.All correct.

Suggested Citation

  • Kim Leonie Kellermann, 2022. "Political inequality, political participation, and support for populist parties," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 33(4), pages 461-482, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:33:y:2022:i:4:d:10.1007_s10602-021-09357-3
    DOI: 10.1007/s10602-021-09357-3
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10602-021-09357-3
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s10602-021-09357-3?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Yann Algan & Sergei Guriev & Elias Papaioannou & Evgenia Passari, 2017. "The European Trust Crisis and the Rise of Populism," Post-Print hal-02381560, HAL.
    2. Yann Algan & Sergei Guriev & Elias Papaioannou & Evgenia Passari, 2017. "The European Trust Crisis and the Rise of Populism," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 48(2 (Fall)), pages 309-400.
    3. Yann Algan & Sergei Guriev & Elias Papaioannou & Evgenia Passari, 2017. "The European Trust Crisis and the Rise of Populism," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 48(2 (Fall)), pages 309-400.
    4. Amory Gethin & Clara Martínez-Toledano & Thomas Piketty, 2022. "Brahmin Left Versus Merchant Right: Changing Political Cleavages in 21 Western Democracies, 1948–2020," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 137(1), pages 1-48.
    5. Assar Lindbeck & Jörgen Weibull, 1987. "Balanced-budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 52(3), pages 273-297, January.
    6. Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2013. "A Political Theory of Populism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 128(2), pages 771-805.
    7. David Card, 1990. "The Impact of the Mariel Boatlift on the Miami Labor Market," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 43(2), pages 245-257, January.
    8. Krieger, Tim & Meierrieks, Daniel, 2016. "Political capitalism: The interaction between income inequality, economic freedom and democracy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 115-132.
    9. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/2i9jel1usb85nr2j7tejsaldfu is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Ruben Durante & Paolo Pinotti & Andrea Tesei, 2019. "The Political Legacy of Entertainment TV," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(7), pages 2497-2530, July.
    11. Giampaolo Bonomi & Nicola Gennaioli & Guido Tabellini, 2021. "Identity, Beliefs, and Political Conflict," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 136(4), pages 2371-2411.
    12. Stadelmann, David & Portmann, Marco & Eichenberger, Reiner, 2015. "Income and policy choices: Evidence from parliamentary decisions and referenda," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 117-120.
    13. Dani Rodrik, 2018. "Populism and the economics of globalization," Journal of International Business Policy, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 1(1), pages 12-33, June.
    14. Gene M Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 2021. "Identity Politics and Trade Policy [Economics of Identity]," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 88(3), pages 1101-1126.
    15. David P. Myatt, 2017. "A Theory of Protest Voting," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 127(603), pages 1527-1567.
    16. Drazen, Allan & Limao, Nuno & Stratmann, Thomas, 2007. "Political contribution caps and lobby formation: Theory and evidence," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(3-4), pages 723-754, April.
    17. Lohmann, Susanne, 1995. "Information, Access, and Contributions: A Signaling Model of Lobbying," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 85(3-4), pages 267-284, December.
    18. Holcombe,Randall G., 2018. "Political Capitalism," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781108449908, October.
    19. Lai, Yu-Bong, 2010. "The political economy of capital market integration and tax competition," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 475-487, December.
    20. Roemer, John E., 1998. "Why the poor do not expropriate the rich: an old argument in new garb," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(3), pages 399-424, December.
    21. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/1divsbu8t888r9vqektjbmlqoa is not listed on IDEAS
    22. Goodin, Robert & Dryzek, John, 1980. "Rational Participation: The Politics of Relative Power," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 10(3), pages 273-292, July.
    23. Ľuboš Pástor & Pietro Veronesi, 2021. "Inequality Aversion, Populism, and the Backlash against Globalization," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 76(6), pages 2857-2906, December.
    24. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2008. "Persistence of Power, Elites, and Institutions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(1), pages 267-293, March.
    25. Frederick Solt, 2015. "Economic Inequality and Nonviolent Protest," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 96(5), pages 1314-1327, November.
    26. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 2002. "Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262661314, December.
    27. David P. Myatt, 2017. "A Theory of Protest Voting," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 127(603), pages 1527-1567, August.
    28. Brady, Henry E. & Verba, Sidney & Schlozman, Kay Lehman, 1995. "Beyond SES: A Resource Model of Political Participation," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 89(2), pages 271-294, June.
    29. Daniel Kselman & Emerson Niou, 2011. "Protest voting in plurality elections: a theory of voter signaling," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 148(3), pages 395-418, September.
    30. Congleton, Roger D & Steunenberg, Bernard, 1998. "Voter Discernment and Candidate Entry in Pluralitarian Election," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 95(3-4), pages 287-305, June.
    31. Nathan J. Kelly & Peter K. Enns, 2010. "Inequality and the Dynamics of Public Opinion: The Self‐Reinforcing Link Between Economic Inequality and Mass Preferences," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 54(4), pages 855-870, October.
    32. Frederick Solt, 2008. "Economic Inequality and Democratic Political Engagement," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 52(1), pages 48-60, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Kellermann, Kim Leonie, 2017. "Political participation and party capture in a dualized economy: A game theory approach," CIW Discussion Papers 4/2017, University of Münster, Center for Interdisciplinary Economics (CIW).
    2. Pan, Wei-Fong, 2023. "Household debt in the times of populism," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 205(C), pages 202-215.
    3. Marco Manacorda & Guido Tabellini & Andrea Tesei, 2022. "Mobile internet and the rise of political tribalism in Europe," CEP Discussion Papers dp1877, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    4. Marco Manacorda & Guido Tabellini & Andrea Tesei, 2022. "Mobile Internet and the Rise of Communitarian Politics," CESifo Working Paper Series 9955, CESifo.
    5. Carlo Altomonte & Gloria Gennaro & Francesco Passarelli, 2019. "Collective Emotions and Protest Vote," CESifo Working Paper Series 7463, CESifo.
    6. Gabriel, Ricardo Duque & Klein, Mathias & Pessoa, Sofia, 2022. "The Political Costs of Austerity," Working Paper Series 418, Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden).
    7. Mizuno, Nobuhiro & Okazawa, Ryosuke, 2018. "Why do voters elect less qualified candidates?," MPRA Paper 89215, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Manuel Funke & Moritz Schularick & Christoph Trebesch, 2023. "Populist Leaders and the Economy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 113(12), pages 3249-3288, December.
    9. Aggeborn, Linuz & Persson, Lovisa, 2017. "Public Finance and Right-Wing Populism," Working Paper Series 1182, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    10. Andrés Rodríguez-Pose & Neil Lee & Cornelius Lipp, 2021. "Golfing with Trump. Social capital, decline, inequality, and the rise of populism in the US," Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society, Cambridge Political Economy Society, vol. 14(3), pages 457-481.
    11. Malte Dold & Tim Krieger, 2023. "The ideological use and abuse of Freiburg’s ordoliberalism," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 195(3), pages 341-361, June.
    12. Amory Gethin & Clara Martínez-Toledano & Thomas Piketty, 2022. "Brahmin Left Versus Merchant Right: Changing Political Cleavages in 21 Western Democracies, 1948–2020," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 137(1), pages 1-48.
    13. Federico Faveretto & Donato Masciandaro, 2018. "Financial Inequality, group entitlements and populism," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1892, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    14. Andres Rodriguez-Pose & Javier Terrero-Davila & Neil Lee, 2023. "Left-behind vs. unequal places: interpersonal inequality, economic decline, and the rise of populism in the US and Europe," Papers in Evolutionary Economic Geography (PEEG) 2306, Utrecht University, Department of Human Geography and Spatial Planning, Group Economic Geography, revised Mar 2023.
    15. Karakas, Leyla D. & Mitra, Devashish, 2020. "Inequality, redistribution and the rise of outsider candidates," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 1-16.
    16. Mathieu Couttenier & Sophie Hatte & Mathias Thoenig & Stephanos Vlachos, 2019. "The Logic of Fear: Populism and Media Coverage of Immigrant Crimes," Working Papers halshs-02095658, HAL.
    17. Cerqua, A. & Ferrante, C. & Letta, M., 2021. "Electoral Earthquake: Natural Disasters and the Geography of Discontent," GLO Discussion Paper Series 790, Global Labor Organization (GLO).
    18. Federico Favaretto & Donato Masciandaro, 2022. "Populism, financial crises and banking policies: Economics and psychology," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 69(4), pages 441-464, September.
    19. Győző Gyöngyösi & Emil Verner, 2022. "Financial Crisis, Creditor‐Debtor Conflict, and Populism," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 77(4), pages 2471-2523, August.
    20. Alexandre Chirat & Cyril Hédoin, 2023. "Toward an economic theory of populism: Uncertainty, Information, and Public Interest in Downs’s Political Economy," EconomiX Working Papers 2023-16, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Populist parties; Political participation; Political inequality; Probabilistic voting;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:33:y:2022:i:4:d:10.1007_s10602-021-09357-3. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.