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A political economy perspective of the constitution of ancient Sparta: conflict resolution, credibility, and stability

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  • George Tridimas

Abstract

Uniquely in Ancient Greece the constitution of Sparta provided for two kings from different dynasties reigning simultaneously, an aristocratic upper house, an annually elected board of overseers, an assembly, and a society of warriors to rule over an enslaved neighbouring population. It contributed to Sparta’s elevation to a great power and lasted almost unaltered for five hundred years until the middle of the third century BCE. The paper argues that the intricate constitutional order resolved internal conflicts about income distribution that had plagued Sparta in her early days. The dual kingship was a power sharing arrangement to avoid intra-elite fighting. Constraints on royal power, military organization and conquest of foreign lands secured redistribution to the Spartan poor solving inter-group conflict between the rich and the poor. The checks and balances provided by the constitution served to credibly commit the elite to the settlements. However, the rigidity of the constitution ossified Sparta’s society who could not respond to changing circumstances.

Suggested Citation

  • George Tridimas, 2025. "A political economy perspective of the constitution of ancient Sparta: conflict resolution, credibility, and stability," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 44-67, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:36:y:2025:i:1:d:10.1007_s10602-024-09453-0
    DOI: 10.1007/s10602-024-09453-0
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Ancient Sparta; Constitution; Dual kingship; King-and-council; Income redistribution; Credibility; Stability; Rebellion; Conquest;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • F51 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
    • N33 - Economic History - - Labor and Consumers, Demography, Education, Health, Welfare, Income, Wealth, Religion, and Philanthropy - - - Europe: Pre-1913
    • N93 - Economic History - - Regional and Urban History - - - Europe: Pre-1913

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