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Federalism, political imbalance, and the right to secession

Author

Listed:
  • Bahar Leventoglu

    (Duke University)

  • Georg Vanberg

    (Duke University)

  • Alessandra Waggoner

    (Duke University)

Abstract

Scholars have generally taken a negative view of the inclusion of secession rights in federal constitutions. Adopting a constitutional political economy perspective, we challenge this consensus by highlighting the critical role that the right to secession can play in enforcing a federal bargain in the face of significant political imbalance among federal sub-units. We demonstrate that the inclusion of a secession right can allow for unanimous constitutional agreement to the formation of a federation in circumstances in which such agreement cannot be reached on a federation without a right to secession, even if union is potentially in the interests of all members.

Suggested Citation

  • Bahar Leventoglu & Georg Vanberg & Alessandra Waggoner, 2025. "Federalism, political imbalance, and the right to secession," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 26-43, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:36:y:2025:i:1:d:10.1007_s10602-025-09462-7
    DOI: 10.1007/s10602-025-09462-7
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Federalism; Secession; Bargaining;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

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