Substance vs. procedure: Constitutional enforcement and constitutional choice
The constitutional political economy research program established by Nobel Laureate James M. Buchanan provides a rigorous analytical framework for the analysis of constitutional choice. I focus on two issues that have received only limited attention in the CPE literature: the problem of constitutional enforcement and the role of judicial review. I demonstrate that incorporating a concern for enforcement into constitutional analysis has significant implications for the the choice among rules, and suggests that procedural constitutional constraints have significant advantages over constitutional norms that attempt to secure broader, substantive values.
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- James Buchanan, 2008. "Same players, different game: how better rules make better politics," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 171-179, September.
- William Niskanen, 1990. "Conditions affecting the survivial of constitutional rules," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 53-62, March.
- Kliemt, Hartmut, 1994. " The Calculus of Consent after Thirty Years," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 79(3-4), pages 341-53, June.
- Buchanan, James M, 1997. " The Balanced Budget Amendment: Clarifying the Arguments," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 90(1-4), pages 117-38, March.
- Daniel Sutter, 1997. "Enforcing Constitutional Constraints," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 139-150, June.
- Niclas Berggren, 2000. "Implementing Generality while Reducing the Risk for Fiscal Explosion," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 353-369, December.
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