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Constitutional Political Economy

In: Readings in Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy

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  • James M. Buchanan

Abstract

There is a categorical distinction to be made between constitutional economics and non-constitutional, or ordinary, economics—a distinction in the ultimate behavioral object of analytical attention. In one sense, all of economics is about choice, and about the varying and complex institutional arrangements within which individuals make choices among alternatives. In ordinary or orthodox economics, no matter how simple or how complex, analysis is concentrated on choices made within constraints that are, themselves, imposed exogenously on the person or persons charged with making the choice. The constraints that restrict the set of feasible choice options may be imposed by nature, by history, by a sequence of past choices, by other persons, by laws and institutional arrangements, or even by custom and convention. In the elementary textbook formulation of demand theory, for example, the individual consumer-purchaser confronts a range of goods available at a set of prices, but is restricted by the size of the budget. This budget is not within the choice set of the consumer-purchaser during the period of choice under scrutiny. Indeed, it would seem unnatural or bizarre, within the mind-set fostered by ordinary economics, to consider or limit the set of available choice options. Within this mind-set, the utility of the chooser is always maximized by allowing for choices over the whole range allowed by the exogenously determined constraints.

Suggested Citation

  • James M. Buchanan, 2008. "Constitutional Political Economy," Springer Books, in: Readings in Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy, chapter 17, pages 281-293, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-0-387-75870-1_17
    DOI: 10.1007/978-0-387-75870-1_17
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. George Selgin, 2016. "Real and Pseudo Monetary Rules," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 36(2), pages 279-296, Spring/Su.
    2. Caleb S. Fuller, 2018. "Privacy law as price control," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 45(2), pages 225-250, April.
    3. Roger D. Congleton, 2018. "Intellectual foundations of public choice, the forest from the trees," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 175(3), pages 229-244, June.
    4. Eric Ip, 2015. "The constitution of economic liberty in Hong Kong," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 307-327, September.
    5. Lucas, David & Boudreaux, Christopher, 2018. "Federal Regulation, Job Creation, and the Moderating Effect of State Economic Freedom," MPRA Paper 92593, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Fuller, Caleb S. & Pusateri, Nicholas R., 2018. "A holistic approach to merger models with an emphasis on heterogeneity," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 260-273.
    7. Glenn Furton & Adam Martin, 2019. "Beyond market failure and government failure," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 178(1), pages 197-216, January.
    8. David M. Levy & Sandra J. Peart, 2017. "Gordon Tullock’s ill-fated appendix: “Flatland Revisited”," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 18-34, March.
    9. David S. Lucas & Christopher J. Boudreaux, 2019. "The Interdependence of Hierarchical Institutions: Federal Regulation, Job Creation, and the Moderating Effect of State Economic Freedom," Papers 1903.02924, arXiv.org.
    10. Vanberg, Georg, 2011. "Substance vs. procedure: Constitutional enforcement and constitutional choice," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 309-318.
    11. T. Durant, 2011. "Making executive politics mutually productive and fair," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 141-172, June.
    12. Boettke, Peter & Fink, Alexander, 2011. "Institutions first," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 7(4), pages 499-504, December.
    13. Hamlin, Alan & Jennings, Colin, 2011. "Expressive Political Behaviour: Foundations, Scope and Implications," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 41(3), pages 645-670, July.
    14. Peter Boettke & Alexander Fink, 2011. "Agent Type, Social Contracts, and Constitutional Mythologies," Studies in Public Choice, in: Alain Marciano (ed.), Constitutional Mythologies, chapter 0, pages 25-37, Springer.
    15. Salter, Alexander W. & Smith, Daniel J., 2019. "Political economists or political economists? The role of political environments in the formation of fed policy under burns, Greenspan, and Bernanke," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 1-13.
    16. Hansson, Åsa & Porter, Susan & Perry Williams, Susan, 2012. "The Effect of Political and Economic Factors on Corporate Tax Rates," Working Paper Series 942, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    17. Pablo Paniagua, 2017. "The institutional rationale of central banking reconsidered," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 231-256, September.
    18. John Meadowcroft, 2020. "Buchanan at the American Founding: the constitutional political economy of a republic of equals and unequals," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 183(3), pages 389-403, June.
    19. Paniagua Pablo, 2016. "The Stability Properties of Monetary Constitutions," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 22(2), pages 113-138, December.
    20. Boettke, Peter, 2010. "Exchange, production, and Samaritan dilemmas," MPRA Paper 33199, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    21. Régis Servant, 2010. "La recherche de bonnes règles sociales: objet de science et de choix démocratique ? Le cas de Friedrich Hayek," Post-Print hal-00641440, HAL.
    22. Régis Servant, 2010. "La recherche de bonnes règles sociales : objet de science ou de choix démocratique ? Le cas de Friedrich Hayek," Post-Print hal-03498010, HAL.
    23. Åsa Hansson & Susan Porter & Susan Williams, 2015. "The importance of the political process on corporate tax policy," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 281-306, September.
    24. Roger D. Congleton, 2022. "Behavioral economics and the Virginia school of political economy: overlaps and complementarities," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 191(3), pages 387-404, June.

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