Exchange, production, and Samaritan dilemmas
Supporters of basic income theories have an admirable goal. However, applying the economic way of thinking to the problem, we see that, while the goal is certainly laudable, the attempt to achieve that goal can lead to disastrous results stemming from knowledge and incentive problems faced by administrators. This paper examines often unexamined problems with implementing a Basic Income Policy.
|Date of creation:||2010|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany|
Web page: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Field, Alexander J., 1991. "Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. By Douglass C. North. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. Pp. viii, 152. $32.50, cloth; $10.95, paper," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 51(04), pages 999-1001, December.
- Price V. Fishback, 2010. "Social Welfare Expenditures in the United States and the Nordic Countries: 1900-2003," NBER Working Papers 15982, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Murray Charles, 2008. "Guaranteed Income as a Replacement for the Welfare State," Basic Income Studies, De Gruyter, vol. 3(2), pages 1-12, November.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:33199. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Joachim Winter)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.