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Institutions first

  • Boettke, Peter
  • Fink, Alexander

Chang (2011) raises doubts about the effects of institutions on economic development and questions the positive effects of entirely free markets based on secure private property rights. We respond by stressing that institutions structure the incentives underlying individual action, secure private property rights are indispensable for prosperity, institutions have a first-order effect whereas policies only have a second-order effect, successful institutional change comes from within a society, and given the status quo of developing countries first-world institutions are likely not to be available to them.

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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 32093.

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Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:32093
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  1. Robert E. Hall & Charles I. Jones, 1999. "Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output per Worker than Others?," NBER Working Papers 6564, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Scully, Gerald W, 1988. "The Institutional Framework and Economic Development," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(3), pages 652-62, June.
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  4. Peter Boettke, 2010. "Is the only form of ‘reasonable regulation’ self regulation?: Lessons from Lin Ostrom on regulating the commons and cultivating citizens," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 143(3), pages 283-291, June.
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  6. Peter J. Boettke & Christopher J. Coyne & Peter T. Leeson, 2015. "Institutional stickiness and the New Development Economics," Chapters, in: Culture and Economic Action, chapter 6, pages 123-146 Edward Elgar.
  7. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, 2002. "Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 117(4), pages 1231-1294.
  8. Christopher Coyne, 2008. "The Politics of Bureaucracy and the failure of post-war reconstruction," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 135(1), pages 11-22, April.
  9. Rodrik, Dani & Subramanian, Arvind & Trebbi, Francesco, 2002. "Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions Over Geography and Integration in Economic Development," CEPR Discussion Papers 3643, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  10. James Buchanan, 2008. "Same players, different game: how better rules make better politics," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 171-179, September.
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  12. repec:oup:qjecon:v:117:y:2002:i:4:p:1231-1294 is not listed on IDEAS
  13. Boettke, Peter J. & Coyne, Christopher J., 2009. "Context Matters: Institutions and Entrepreneurship," Foundations and Trends(R) in Entrepreneurship, now publishers, vol. 5(3), pages 135-209, March.
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  18. Chang, Ha-Joon, 2011. "Institutions and economic development: theory, policy and history," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 7(04), pages 473-498, December.
  19. repec:oup:qjecon:v:114:y:1999:i:1:p:83-116 is not listed on IDEAS
  20. Robert E. Hall & Charles I. Jones, 1999. "Why do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker than Others?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 114(1), pages 83-116.
  21. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, 2000. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation," NBER Working Papers 7771, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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