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The best Condorcet-compatible election method: Ranked Pairs

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  • Charles T. Munger

    (Hold Politicians Accountable)

Abstract

Condorcet-compatible election methods are examined and compared. The Ranked Pairs method proves significantly better than Beatpath; that both are clone-free, and have other desirable properties, makes them much better than any alternative.

Suggested Citation

  • Charles T. Munger, 2023. "The best Condorcet-compatible election method: Ranked Pairs," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 434-444, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:34:y:2023:i:3:d:10.1007_s10602-022-09382-w
    DOI: 10.1007/s10602-022-09382-w
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Markus Schulze, 2011. "A new monotonic, clone-independent, reversal symmetric, and condorcet-consistent single-winner election method," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 36(2), pages 267-303, February.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Ranked Pairs; Beatpath; Kemeny–Young; Ranked choice ballots;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C02 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - Mathematical Economics
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • K16 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Election Law
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government

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