IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/copoec/v33y2022i1d10.1007_s10602-021-09334-w.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Where you stand depends on where you live: county voting on the Texas secession referendum

Author

Listed:
  • Curtis Bram

    (Duke University)

  • Michael Munger

    (Duke University)

Abstract

During the first half of the 19th century, Western Texas was a “trap baited with grass” that attracted migrants hoping to farm. When settlers on the wrong side of an unknown, invisible line could not build successful farms, residents in those counties voted to remain in the Union at far higher rates than residents in neighboring counties who could farm. The connection between the vote and economic interest was obvious, as those without suitable land could not make use of enslaved labor, which was too expensive given the implicit marginal product of labor. Because the location of settlement was plausibly random, these results highlight the importance of economic interest as a determinant of even fundamental moral beliefs that affect vote choice.

Suggested Citation

  • Curtis Bram & Michael Munger, 2022. "Where you stand depends on where you live: county voting on the Texas secession referendum," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 67-79, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:33:y:2022:i:1:d:10.1007_s10602-021-09334-w
    DOI: 10.1007/s10602-021-09334-w
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10602-021-09334-w
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s10602-021-09334-w?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Libecap, Gary D. & Hansen, Zeynep Kocabiyik, 2002. "“Rain Follows The Plow” And Dryfarming Doctrine: The Climate Information Problem And Homestead Failure In The Upper Great Plains, 1890–1925," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 62(1), pages 86-120, March.
    2. Martijn Huysmans & Christophe Crombez, 2020. "Making exit costly but efficient: the political economy of exit clauses and secession," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 89-110, March.
    3. Lawrence M. Anderson, 2004. "The Institutional Basis of Secessionist Politics: Federalism and Secession in the United States," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 34(2), pages 1-18, Spring.
    4. Keele, Luke & Titiunik, Rocío, 2016. "Natural Experiments Based on Geography—ERRATUM," Political Science Research and Methods, Cambridge University Press, vol. 4(2), pages 449-449, May.
    5. Jac Heckelman & John Dinan, 2007. "Voting on voting with the feet: a cross-county analysis of the Tennessee popular referenda to secede from the union," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 83-97, June.
    6. Levitt, Steven D & Snyder, James M, Jr, 1997. "The Impact of Federal Spending on House Election Outcomes," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 30-53, February.
    7. Georg Vanberg, 2018. "Constitutional political economy, democratic theory and institutional design," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 177(3), pages 199-216, December.
    8. Jeffrey Grynaviski & Michael Munger, 2014. "Erratum to: Did southerners favor slavery? Inferences from an analysis of prices in New Orleans, 1805–1860," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 160(1), pages 293-293, July.
    9. Peter Kurrild‐Klitgaard, 2002. "Opting‐Out: the Constitutional Economics of Exit," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(1), pages 123-158, January.
    10. Michael Reksulak & Gökhan Karahan & William Shughart, 2007. "Flags of our fathers: Voting on Confederate symbols in the State of Georgia," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 131(1), pages 83-99, April.
    11. Zachary Liscow, 2012. "Why fight secession? Evidence of economic motivations from the American Civil War," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 153(1), pages 37-54, October.
    12. Edward J. López & Daniel Sutter, 2004. "Ignorance in Congressional Voting? Evidence from Policy Reversal on the Endangered Species Act," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 85(4), pages 891-912, December.
    13. Stefan Voigt, 1999. "Explaining Constitutional Change," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1847.
    14. Elinder, Mikael & Jordahl, Henrik & Poutvaara, Panu, 2015. "Promises, policies and pocketbook voting," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 177-194.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Meya, Johannes & Poutvaara, Panu & Schwager, Robert, 2015. "Pocketbook voting and social preferences in referenda," VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 113120, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    2. Meya, Johannes & Poutvaara, Panu & Schwager, Robert, 2020. "Pocketbook voting, social preferences, and expressive motives in referenda," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 185-205.
    3. Stephan Schneider & Sven Kunze, 2021. "Disastrous Discretion: Ambiguous Decision Situations Foster Political Favoritism," KOF Working papers 21-491, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich.
    4. repec:osf:osfxxx:93tz4_v1 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Arbatli, Cemal Eren & Gomtsyan, David, 2019. "Voting retrospectively: Critical junctures and party identification," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 356-390.
    6. Kärnä, Anders & Karlsson, Johan & Engberg, Erik & Svensson, Peter, 2020. "Political Failure: A Missing Piece in Innovation Policy Analysis," Working Paper Series 1334, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised 21 Apr 2022.
    7. Wang, Chendi, 2023. "The Streets Speak: Unravelling the Impact of Austerity on Public Protests during the the Great Recession," OSF Preprints 93tz4, Center for Open Science.
    8. Bordignon, Massimo & Franzoni, Federico & Gamalerio, Matteo, 2024. "Is Populism reversible? Evidence from Italian local elections during the pandemic," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
    9. Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, 2004. "Ulysses and the Rent-Seekers: The Benefits and Challenges of Constitutional Constraints on Leviathan," Advances in Austrian Economics, in: The Dynamics of Intervention: Regulation and Redistribution in the Mixed Economy, pages 245-278, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
    10. Stuart Kasdin & Luona Lin, 2015. "Strategic behavior by federal agencies in the allocation of public resources," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 164(3), pages 309-329, September.
    11. Thushyanthan Baskaran & Zohal Hessami, 2017. "Political alignment and intergovernmental transfers in parliamentary systems: evidence from Germany," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 171(1), pages 75-98, April.
    12. Ernesto Dal Bó & Pedro Dal Bó & Jason Snyder, 2009. "Political Dynasties," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 76(1), pages 115-142.
    13. Lundin, Magnus & Gottfries, Nils & Lindström, Tomas, 2004. "Price and Investment Dynamics: An Empirical Analysis of Plant Level Data," Working Paper Series 2004:7, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
    14. John Landon-Lane & Hugh Rockoff & Richard H. Steckel, 2011. "Droughts, Floods and Financial Distress in the United States," NBER Chapters, in: The Economics of Climate Change: Adaptations Past and Present, pages 73-98, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Pierre Andre & Sandrine Mesplé-Somps, 2010. "Politics and the geographic allocation of public funds in a semi-democracy. The case of Ghana, 1996 - 2004," Working Papers halshs-00962698, HAL.
    16. Liebert, Helge, 2019. "Does external medical review reduce disability insurance inflow?," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 108-128.
    17. Aepli, Manuel & Kuhn, Andreas & Schweri, Jürg, 2021. "Culture, norms, and the provision of training by employers: Evidence from the Swiss language border," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    18. Stefano Gagliarducci & Marco Manacorda, 2020. "Politics in the Family: Nepotism and the Hiring Decisions of Italian Firms," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(2), pages 67-95, April.
    19. Ekkehard A. Köhler & Daniel Nientiedt, 2023. "Was Walter Eucken a proponent of authoritarian liberalism?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 195(3), pages 363-376, June.
    20. Bellani, Luna & Berriochoa, Kattalina & Kapteina, Mark & Schwerdt, Guido, 2024. "Information Provision and Support for Inheritance Taxation: Evidence from a Representative Survey Experiment in Germany," IZA Discussion Papers 17099, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    21. Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, 2010. "Exit, collective action and polycentric political systems," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 143(3), pages 339-352, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:33:y:2022:i:1:d:10.1007_s10602-021-09334-w. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.