Institutions and information in multilateral bargaining experiments
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DOI: 10.1515/bejeap-2012-0054
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Cited by:
- Winn, Abel M. & McCarter, Matthew W., 2018.
"Who's holding out? An experimental study of the benefits and burdens of eminent domain,"
Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 176-185.
- Abel M. Winn & Matthew W. McCarter, 2016. "Who’s Holding Out? An Experimental Study of the Benefits and Burdens of Eminent Domain," Working Papers 0154mkt, College of Business, University of Texas at San Antonio.
- Smith, Gregory & Day, Brett, 2018. "Addressing the Collective Action Problem in Multiple-purchaser PES: An Experimental Investigation of Negotiated Payment Contributions," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 36-58.
- Portillo, Javier E., 2019. "Land-assembly and externalities: How do positive post-development externalities affect land aggregation outcomes?," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 104-124.
- Isaac, R. Mark & Kitchens, Carl & Portillo, Javier E., 2016. "Can buyer “mobility” reduce aggregation failures in land-assembly?," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 16-30.
- Zillante, Artie & Read, Dustin C. & Seiler, Michael J., 2020. "Assembling land for urban revitalization in the presence of linchpin parcels and information asymmetries: An experimental investigation," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 99(C).
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