Decision costs in legislative bargaining: an experimental analysis
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-011-9866-z
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- Luis Miller & Christoph Vanberg, 2011. "Decision costs in legislative bargaining: An experimental analysis," Discussion Papers 2011002, University of Oxford, Nuffield College.
References listed on IDEAS
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Jan Zápal, 2017. "Crafting consensus," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 173(1), pages 169-200, October.
- Miller, Luis & Montero, Maria & Vanberg, Christoph, 2018.
"Legislative bargaining with heterogeneous disagreement values: Theory and experiments,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 60-92.
- Luis Miller & Maria Montero & Christoph Vanberg, 2015. "Legislative Bargaining with Heterogeneous Disagreement Values: Theory and Experiments," Discussion Papers 2015-24, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- Maaser, Nicola & Traub, Stefan & Paetzel, Fabian, 2017. "Power illusion in coalitional bargaining: An experimental analysis," VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168155, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Salvatore Nunnari, 2019. "Dynamic Legislative Bargaining with Veto Power: Theory and Experiments," Working Papers 649, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Tremewan, James & Vanberg, Christoph, 2018. "Voting rules in multilateral bargaining: using an experiment to relax procedural assumptions," Working Papers 0651, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
- Anna Merkel & Christoph Vanberg, 2020. "Legislative bargaining with costly communication," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 183(1), pages 3-27, April.
- Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Meshalkin, Andrey & Predtetchinski, Arkadi, 2018.
"Subgame perfect equilibria in majoritarian bargaining,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 101-112.
- Herings, P.J.J. & Meshalkin, A.V. & Predtetchinski, A., 2013. "Subgame perfect equilibria in majoritarian bargaining," Research Memorandum 072, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
- Tremewan, James & Vanberg, Christoph, 2016.
"The dynamics of coalition formation – A multilateral bargaining experiment with free timing of moves,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 33-46.
- Tremewan, James & Vanberg, Christoph, 2015. "The dynamics of coalition formation - a multilateral bargaining experiment with free timing of moves," Working Papers 0582, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
- Dongwon Lee, 2016. "Supermajority rule and bicameral bargaining," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 169(1), pages 53-75, October.
- Nunnari, Salvatore & Zapal, Jan, 2016. "Gambler's fallacy and imperfect best response in legislative bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 275-294.
- Miller, Luis & Vanberg, Christoph, 2015.
"Group size and decision rules in legislative bargaining,"
European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 288-302.
- Miller , Luis & Vanberg, Christoph, 2014. "Group size and decision rules in legislative bargaining," Working Papers 0558, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
- Daniela Glätzle-Rützler & Philipp Lergetporer & Matthias Sutter, 2019.
"Collective Intertemporal Decisions and Heterogeneity in Groups,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
7716, CESifo.
- Daniela Glätzle-Rützler & Philipp Lergetporer & Matthias Sutter, 2019. "Collective intertemporal decisions and heterogeneity in groups," Working Papers 2019-10, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.
- Andrzej Baranski & Rebecca Morton, 2020. "The Determinants of Multilateral Bargaining: A Comprehensive Analysis of Baron and Ferejohn Majoritarian Bargaining Experiments," Working Papers 20200037, New York University Abu Dhabi, Department of Social Science, revised Sep 2020.
- Hakan Genc & Serkan Kucuksenel, 2019.
"Bargaining in legislatures over private and public goods with endogenous recognition,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 181(3), pages 351-373, December.
- Hakan Genç & Serkan Küçükşenel, 2018. "Bargaining In Legislatures Over Private And Public Goods With Endogenous Recognition," ERC Working Papers 1805, ERC - Economic Research Center, Middle East Technical University, revised Mar 2018.
- Dougherty, Keith L. & Kisaalita, Alice & McKissick, Jordan & Katz, Evan, 2020. "Stopping rules for majority voting: A public choice experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 353-364.
- Agranov, Marina & Tergiman, Chloe, 2014. "Communication in multilateral bargaining," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 75-85.
- Guillaume R. Fréchette & Emanuel Vespa, 2017. "The determinants of voting in multilateral bargaining games," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 3(1), pages 26-43, July.
- Marina Agranov & Chloe Tergiman, 2019. "Communication in bargaining games with unanimity," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 22(2), pages 350-368, June.
- Duk Gyoo Kim & Wooyoung Lim, 2019. "Multilateral Bargaining over the Division of Losses," CESifo Working Paper Series 8011, CESifo.
- Miller Moya, Luis Miguel & Vanberg, Christoph, 2014. "Group size and decision rules in legislative bargaining," DFAEII Working Papers DFAE-II;2014-01, University of the Basque Country - Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II.
- Anita Gantner & Kristian Horn & Rudolf Kerschbamer, 2013. "Fair Division in Unanimity Bargaining with Subjective Claims," Working Papers 2013-31, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.
More about this item
Keywords
Collective decision-making; Majority rule; Unanimity; Legislative bargaining; Experimental economics; C78; C92; D71; D72;JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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